



Daily Report

Central Eurasia

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Key Developments

FBIS Duma Election Report 8 Nov

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[FBIS Media Note] *This is the eighth in a weekly series of reports FBIS will produce on the campaign for the 17 December Russian Duma elections. It is based solely on Russian media reporting.*

Recent Developments

Yabloko, Derzhava Registered The Central Electoral Commission (CEC) registered the Yabloko and Derzhava parties after the Supreme Court ruled that the CEC's refusal to register the parties for the elections was illegal. During Yabloko's hearing, party leader Grigoriy Yavlinskiy charged that the CEC pressured Valeriy Galchenko, deputy chairman of the Moscow Regional Duma, into signing a statement that he was put on the party's candidate list without his knowledge (NTV, 3 November)

The court overturned the rejection of Derzhava on 3 November, and the CEC registered the party the following day (INTERFAX, 4 November)

CEC chairman Nikolay Ryabov appeared to be more upset by the court's ruling on Yabloko than its reversal of the Derzhava decision. After the Yabloko decision was announced, Ryabov accused the court of a "real abuse of power" (Russian TV, 5 November) and of ignoring "completely obvious things" (INTERFAX, 4 November) during the hearing. Ryabov reacted to the Derzhava ruling by promising to fulfill the court's decision (INTERFAX, 3 November)

At Least Thirty-eight Parties To Appear on Party List Ballot The CEC registered thirty-eight parties to run for the 225 seats that will be allotted by proportional representation. The 38 registered parties are: the CPRF, the Congress of Russian Communities (KRO), the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), Women of Russia, the Agrarian Party of Russia (APR), the Bloc of Ivan Rybkin, Russia is Our Home (NDR), the Union of Labor and Industrialists of Russia, the Party of Beerlovers, Derzhava, the Bloc of Tikhonov-Tupolev-Tikhonov, Forward Russia, Common Cause, the Bloc of Pamfilova-Gurov-Lysenko, the Party of Workers' Self-Government, Yabloko, the People's Union, For the Motherland, Landmark Generation, Russia's Democratic Choice-United Democrats, social Democrats, National-Republican Party of Russia, Kedr, My Fatherland, Power to the People, Party of Economic Freedom, Nur, Bloc of Stanislav Govorukhin, Stable Russia, 89, Movement of All Nations of Russia, Christian-Democratic Union of Russia, Party of Rus-

sian Unity and Accord (PRES), Union of Pensioners, Communists-Working Russia-for the Soviet Union, Duma 96, Interethnic Union, and Transformation of the Fatherland.

Court cases are pending for five parties that collected 200,000 signatures but the CEC refused to register: the National Salvation Front, the Movement of Transport Workers, the Movement of Housing and Municipal Workers, the Union of Patriots, and the Independent Bloc.

Calls For Changes to Election Law Intensify The CEC's annulment of Yabloko's and Derzhava's registration appears to have spurred demands from several political groups for radical changes in the Duma Election Law.

- Duma deputies Irina Khakamada and Vyacheslav Nikonov announced they will appeal to the Constitutional Court to rule on provisions of the Duma Election Law concerning the "legislative and judicial powers" of the CEC. They also intend to submit a bill to the Duma on 10 November to amend the election law to require a second round of voting in districts where no candidate wins a majority; remove the choice of "none of the above" from the ballot; and invalidate the election if the parties that pass the five percent threshold fail to account for at least half the total party list vote. They claim to have already collected the 90 signatures necessary for a court appeal (SEGODNYA, 3 November)
- Duma Chairman Ivan Rybkin told journalists that it is "quite feasible" to amend the election law and the five-percent barrier "could well be removed." He asserted that "only three to four" parties "will be able to win seats" in the Duma but added that his own bloc will "successfully surmount the barrier" (INTERFAX, 2 November)

The CPRF and the APR have criticized the effort to amend the law. CPRF leader Gennadiy Zyuganov said that the law had been adopted "unanimously" but now that "one bloc made a bad job of collecting signatures, another did not draw up proper documents, and a third sees it has no prospects, a powerful attack begins on the law" (NTV, 2 November). APR member Vladimir Isakov, head of the Duma Commission on Legislation, Judicial and Legal Reform, called the law's critics "a minority in the Duma" and predicted that the Duma will reject the amendments (ITAR-TASS, 4 November)

KRO, CPRF Not Cooperating . . . Or Are They? Citing a "well-informed source" in the Congress of Russian Communities' (KRO) leadership, Trud (2 November) reported that it is "possible" that a "very close electoral

alliance will be formed" between the KRO and CPRF. Commenting on the possibility, CPRF leader Gennadiy Zyuganov told INTERFAX (2 November) that an agreement between his party and the Agrarian Party of Russia (APR) "not to advance their candidates in the same single-mandate districts" could serve as an "example" of cooperation and remarked that a "similar agreement might be reached" with the KRO. KRO leader Yuriy Skokov bristled when asked to comment on the rumors. Skokov told correspondents from Russian Television's "Voskresenye" program (5 November) that he and Zyuganov "live in the same building and sometimes we bump into each other." Skokov claimed that after these encounters "Zyuganov announces at a news conference" that negotiations have begun, though "I know perfectly well that the situation is entirely different." Skokov added that he does not "reject either the movement, or the party, or Zyuganov. If we do in fact reach an agreement with them on these basic points, I will have no problem with that."

Refusing to recant his claims, Zyuganov told the "Voskresenye" correspondents that "negotiations" with the KRO "were indeed underway." He also asserted that "recently we also had a short meeting" with KRO number two candidate Aleksandr Lebed and reiterated that "we are holding consultations" with the KRO.

Zyuganov Favors "Popular Property" Speaking at a conference commemorating the 78th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Zyuganov asserted that while the party "no longer condemns private property," only "popular property" can "ensure social justice, guarantee education for young people, social protection for elderly people, and the maintenance of a strong army" (INTERFAX, 6 November)

In the Provinces

27 Current Duma Deputies Vying in Moscow Oblast's 11 Districts INTERFAX (6 November) reported that 167 candidates—significantly fewer than the "nearly 230" cited earlier by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA (24 October)—are running in Moscow Oblast's eleven districts. They include 27 current Duma deputies. Among the more prominent candidates are current Duma deputies Vladimir Lukin (Yabloko), Sergey Yushenkov (Russia's Democratic Choice), German Titov (CPRF), Sergey Kalashnikov (LDPR), Anatoliy Sliva (Party of Russian Unity and Accord), Bela Denisenko (Forward, Russia!), and Viktor Ustinov (Ivan Rybkin's Bloc), as well as Federation Council Deputy Chairman Anatoliy Dolgoplatev (Trade Unions and Industrialists of Russia—Union of Labor)

Field Set for Sverdlovsk Oblast's Seven Districts SEGODNYA (3 November) reported that the oblast

electoral commission registered 67 candidates to run in the oblast's seven single-seat races. The LDPR and Boris Fedorov's Forward, Russia! are fielding candidates in five districts, Governor Eduard Rossel's Transformation of the Fatherland in four, and the CPRF and the more hardline Communists—Working Russia—For the Soviet Union are each running in two districts. According to Segodnya, "enterprise managers and civil servants" are predominant among the candidates and women account for one-sixth. Among the leading candidates are several current Duma deputies, including former Yeltsin eminence grise Gennadiy Burbulis, Leonid Nekrasov, Andrey Selivanov, and Larisa Mishustina as well as Federation Council member Galina Karelova.

34 Candidates Make the Cut for Perm Oblast's 4 District Races Citing the oblast electoral commission, SEGODNYA (2 November) reported that 34 candidates were registered to compete in the oblast's four single-seat races. The LDPR is fielding candidates in all four districts, the Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES) and Russia is Our Home (NDR) in two each, and six other parties are running only in one district. Among the more prominent contenders are current Duma deputies Viktor Pokhmelkin, Vladimir Kravtsov, and Vladimir Zelenin; Perm city and oblast MVD chiefs Nail Salakhov and Valeriy Fedorov; and Viktor Stepankov, currently deputy head of the oblast's administration and former Russian Federation General Prosecutor under President Yeltsin.

SEGODNYA reported that irregularities kept several other prominent oblast legislators off the ballot. A district electoral commission ruled that 70 percent of the signatures collected by Vladimir Zotin, an oblast legislator and leader of the regional Yabloko branch, were "null and void" and refused to accept a "new" batch of signatures Zotin submitted "virtually a few minutes before" the 22 October deadline. SEGODNYA also noted that an unnamed Perm newspaper reported that "all" of the signature lists for Rossel's Transformation of the Fatherland were "given back" after oblast legislator Andrey Klimov "informed" the CEC that he had "nothing to do" with the bloc although he was included on its list.

Eight Candidates in Chechnya's Lone District Race Despite the lingering conflict in Chechnya, the republic is reportedly set to take Part in the Duma elections. Chechen CEC Chairman Abdul Kerim Arsakhanov told ITAR-TASS (4 November) that eight candidates were registered to contest the republic's Chechenskiy single-seat race (Electoral District No. 31). Among the leading candidates are Lecha Magomadov, the CPRF's candidate and chairman of the Chechen Committee for Na-

tional Accord; Aslanbek Aslankhanov, the former chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet's Committee on Legal and Anticrime Issues; Ibragim Suleymenov, the republic's military commissar; and Chechen Agriculture Minister Alash Saikhanov. Arsakhanov said the CPRF and the APR have "strong positions" in the republic and added that only the LDPR candidate was denied registration.

Arsakhanov also asserted that because of "strong political pressure" from "Dudayev supporters," electoral commissions have not been set up in Nozhay-Yurt, Vedeno, Achkhoy-Martan, and "some other" districts. He said that Dudayev's supporters have launched a "propaganda campaign" under the slogan "if you take part in the election to the State Duma, you give up Chechen sovereignty."

Moscow City Races Detailed The following is a compilation of information on well-known candidates in five of Moscow city's fifteen single-seat districts. The list of registered candidates was published in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA on 27 and 31 October. **Avtorzavodskiy (Electoral District No. 191)**

Eduard Vorobyev (Russia's Democratic Choice-United Democrats) — Colonel General Vorobyev was deputy commander in chief of Russia's ground forces when he was discharged in January for refusing to fight in Chechnya. A strong proponent of military reform, he is also fourth on Russia's Democratic Choice's core list.

Yelena Mavrodi (independent) — The 25-year-old Mavrodi is a former model and the wife of Sergey Mavrodi, the infamous head of the MMM pyramid scheme and a Duma deputy. Yelena ran for a vacant Duma seat in May in a Moscow Oblast district, placing third with 11.5 percent of the vote after a bitter campaign in which another candidate, extreme nationalist Aleksey Vedenkin, distributed leaflets that read "All photo models to brothels!" (MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, 19-25 May)

Yuri Palchikov (independent) — The head of the Association of Investors, Palchikov claims to represent 60 investment groups with a Moscow membership of 2.5 to 3 million investors, whose losses amount to "10 trillion rubles" from unscrupulous entrepreneurs such as the Mavrodis (ORT, 27 January).

Andrey Golovin (Bloc of Govorukhin) — Golovin heads the Popular Alliance Patriotic movement and is fourth on Govorukhin's core list. As the leader of the "Change-New Policy" faction of the Congress of People's Deputies, he helped establish the Civic Union in 1993 (ROSSIYA, 18 August 1993) **Babushinskiy (Electoral District No. 192)**

Yuliy Nisnevich (Russia's Democratic Choice-United Democrats) — Nisnevich, the incumbent, is chairman of the Duma's Subcommittee on Computer Technology and was instrumental in the establishment of the "Vybory" election tabulation computer system (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 17 June)

Larisa Babukh (Education is the Future of Russia (DOBRO) — Elected to the Duma on the Women of Russia ticket in 1993, Babukh split with that group to form DOBRO. Before becoming a deputy, she founded her own firm and a regional women's association.

Konstantin Kalachev (Beerlovers Party) — The 31-year-old Kalachalev went from head of the For Tax and Legal Reform and Free Trade Association to chairman of the Beerlovers Party after the 1993 elections. A strong free market and trade proponent, Kalachalev was an adviser to Moscow Mayor Luzhkov on tax reform and general director of the Russian-American Economic Association. He ran for the Duma in 1993 on PRES's ticket. Asked about his party's name, Kalachalev said that beer is "a symbol of socialization" and "a catalyst of thought" (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 11 October)

Valeriya Novodvorskaya (Party of Economic Freedom) — A well-known human rights activist, Novodvorskaya has been a harsh critic of Yeltsin as the leader of the People's Democratic Union. In January, she called for Russian soldiers in Chechnya to desert and offered support for "Chechen volunteers" fighting against the Russian Army (INTERFAX, 14 January). Staunchly anti-communist and anti-fascist, she has been described by party leader Konstantin Borovoy as the party's "chief ideologist" (INTERFAX, 26 September)

Mikhail Astafyev (Zemskiy Sobor) — Astafyev was one of eight Derzhava leaders to leave the party in September because of party chairman Aleksandr Rutskoy's alleged "criminalization of the party's list of candidates" (ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI, 13 September). He has headed numerous right-wing associations and has called for the "unambiguous" introduction of "emergency measures" to combat crime and a return to Russia's "rightful" borders "established at the end of World War II" (SEGODNYA, 3 June 1994).

Vladimir Voronin (independent) — Voronin is a former leader of the Center Bloc of the USSR, the creator of the Sakharov Union of Democratic Forces, and original member of the National Salvation Front.

Aleksandr Artsibashev (APR) — Artsibashev is a correspondent for Podmoskovye television-radio company and has reported on agricultural affairs for ORT.

Telman Gdlyan (Bloc of Independents) — Gdlyan made a name for himself as an investigator in the USSR

General Prosecutor's office in the early 1990s, when he uncovered massive corruption in the Uzbek Communist Party and the USSR??? Supreme Soviet (Argumenty I Fakty, December 1991). He founded the Russia's Popular Party, which ran unsuccessfully in the 1993 elections. **Kuntsevskiy (Electoral District No. 193)**

Aleksey Golovkov (independent) — Although running as an independent, Golovkov has been a key figure in NDR, which has apparently been blocked from fielding candidates in Moscow city districts (KOMMERSANT-DAILY, 30 September). He has acted as NDR cochairman and has been in charge of running the bloc's day-to-day operations (SEGODNYA, 1 August). He was chief of staff of Yegor Gaidar's government in 1992 and later served as an adviser to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin (INTERFAX, 11 January 1993). He is the executive director of the Association of Privatizing and Private Enterprises and reportedly has "close relations with large banking structures" (KOMMERSANT DAILY, 11 May).

Georgiy Zadonskiy (Russia's Democratic Choice-United Democrats) — Zadonskiy beat 11 other candidates in 1993 in the Zapadnyi district, which included most of the new Kuntsevskiy district. He was an active deputy in the Congress of People's Deputies as a member of the reformist Democratic Russia and participated in the Constitutional Conference in 1993 (ITAR-TASS, 13 June).

Oleg Petrov (Stable Russia) — Petrov heads what is left of Stable Russia after the defection of several of the faction's leaders and Duma deputies to NDR and the Bloc of Ivan Rybkin. He is a former diplomat and a leading member of associations that promote business and democracy (SEGODNYA, 12 September). Viktor Uchitel (Yabloko) — Uchitel heads the Russian Christian Democratic Union, which is a part of Yabloko. He was 34th on Yabloko's candidate list in 1993 and was one of the original founders of the party (INTERFAX, 15 October) **Leningradskiy (Electoral District No. 194)**

Vladimir Lysenko (Pamfilova-Gurov-Lysenko) — Lysenko was elected to the Duma in 1993 on Yabloko's ticket but was expelled from the party for advocating cooperation with Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin (KOMMERSANT-DAILY, 13 July 1994). He heads the Republican Party and is chairman of the Duma Subcommittee on Federal Relations. After several fact-finding missions to Grozny, he warned in early December 1993 that military intervention in Chechnya would be a military and political disaster for Yeltsin (RTV, 4 December 1994). He has expressed concern that voters will confuse him with ultra-nationalist

Duma Deputy Nikolay Lysenko, head of the National-Republican Party of Russia (TRUD, 21 September)

Vladimir Kovalenok (Party of Economic Freedom) — A former cosmonaut, Colonel General Kovalenok heads the Zhukovskiy Air Force Academy.

Alla Yaroshinskaya (independent) — Yaroshinskaya won the "International Minor Nobel Prize" for authoring a book about the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1992. She donated her proceeds to Chernobyl victims and set up a fund to aid survivors (ITAR-TASS, 4 June 1993). She is secretary of the Russian Union of Journalists and has served on the Presidential Council since early 1993 as a media adviser (ITAR-TASS, 3 February 1993). **Lyublinskiy (Electoral District No. 195)**

Boris Fedorov (Forward, Russia!) — Fedorov has twice served as finance minister, was Chernomyrdin's deputy prime minister until January 1994, headed a department at the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, and founded his own party last spring. He won the district in a nine-candidate race in 1993 and was also sixth on Russia's Choice's list (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 12 November 1993). He left that party immediately after the elections, however, to help form the Union of 12 December (SEGODNYA, 19 January 1994). After that movement folded, he set up his own Forward, Russia! movement.

Klara Luchko (APR) — Luchko, a seventy-year-old actress, has been an outspoken opponent of land privatization (SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 31 October)

Yuriy Nazarov (CPRF) — A well-known actor, Nazarov was recently mugged by "two big men" wearing "brass knuckles" outside a Moscow train station (EKHO MOSKVY, 3 November).

The Media Beat

Rossiyskaya Gazeta Notes Cost of TV Advertising The 1 November issue of the Council of Ministers-sponsored newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta included an analysis of television stations' rates for paid political advertising. According to the paper, such rates "generally coincide with advertising rates" and "all the television and radio companies have fixed prices in dollars." The paper reported the following rates for paid ads:

- Public Russian Television (ORT): One minute of advertising "minus tax" during "dead time" on a work day (0100-0500 local time) costs \$1,500; one minute of "prime time" on Friday evenings (1900-2200) costs \$30,000.
- Russian Television (RTV): \$3,650 per minute in the 0700-0730 time slot; \$3,000 from 2355-0045.

- NTV: The independent television company has "warned" that campaign "video clips" can occupy no more than 15 percent of its air time. One minute during the "Tennis at Midnight" program costs \$800, and one minute during the popular Sunday evening "Itogi" program costs \$28,000. According to Rossiyskaya Gazeta, prices are determined by the "Video International" advertising company that holds the "sole right to place advertising on this channel."
- St. Petersburg-Channel 5 TV: The channel reportedly submitted "the most elaborate pricing structure" to the CEC and set three categories for the rates it charges: live airtime, relay of prerecorded videos, and advertising slots. Thirty seconds of advertising on Saturdays and Sundays in the 1930-2045 time slot costs \$3,000 and the "cheapest" 30 second spot costs \$600 on workdays between 1300 and 1900.
- Moscow 2X2 TV: According to ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, sales of this channel's advertising time are also led by Video International, "the unknown giant of the national television business." Prices range from \$500 for one minute during "the dead of night" to \$4,800 during "prime time," excluding VAT and "special" taxes.
- TV-6: One minute of air time during the 0830 "Apteka" program costs \$500. However, one minute of paid advertising that "interrupts" the popular imported "Baywatch" program that airs on Saturdays at 1900 costs \$5,600 to compensate for viewers' "displeasure."

Rossiyskiye Vesti in Quandary on Free Political Advertising The controversy over registration of parties and blocs is delaying the publication of free campaign advertising in at least one state-controlled newspaper. The Presidential Administration-sponsored newspaper ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI announced on 5 November that because the registration of parties and blocs had not been completed yet, its editorial board could not conduct a CEC-stipulated lottery to determine a publication schedule by 5 November—the date specified in the law on Duma elections for free political advertising in state-owned print media to begin. The paper asserted that "under these conditions ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI is unable to publish election materials free of charge." Noting that ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI is "only 25-percent funded out of the [federal] budget," the paper's editorial board also claimed that it has "not yet received the promised appropriations to cover expenditures connected with the free publication of election materials."

The paper also published on 2 November its rates for paid political advertising. A full-page ad costs

100 million rubles (over 22,000 dollars at the current exchange rate); half a page—54 million rubles; a quarter of a page—28 million rubles; an eighth of a page—16 million rubles; and a sixteenth of a page—9 million rubles.

Registered Parties and Blocs and Their Top Candidates

Official candidate lists for the following parties and blocs registered by the CEC were published in ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA from 25 October-2 November. Each entry below lists the party's 12 core federal list candidates in order and gives the date when the list was published.

Communist Party of the Russian Federation [Kommunisticheskaya partiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii] Gennadiy Zyuganov, Svetlana Goryacheva, Amangeldy Tuleyev, Valentin Chikin, Yuriy Maslyukov, Valentin Kuptsov, Anatoliy Ionov, Valeriy Tarasov, Yuriy Ivanov, Aleksey Podberezkin, Nikolay Savelyev, Valeriy Vorotnikov. (Federal list published 25 October).

Congress of Russian Communities [Kongress russkikh obshchin] Yuriy Skokov, Aleksandr Lebed, Sergey Glazyev, Lyudmila Vartazarova, Dmitriy Rogozin, Yuriy Kalmykov, Vasiliy Romanov, Mikhail Kolchev, Oleg Denisov, Tatyana Malyutina, Sergey Goncharov, Sergey Burkov. (Federal list published 25 October).

Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia [Liberalno-demokraticeskaya partiya Rossii] Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Sergey Abeltsev, Aleksandr Vengerovskiy, Stanislav Zhebrovskiy, Aleksey Mitrofanov, Mikhail Gutseriyev, Mikhail Monastyrskiy, Mikhail Musatov, Vladimir Gusev, Nataliya Narycheva, Oleg Finko, Sergey Kalashnikov. (Federal list published 26 October).

Women of Russia [Zhenshchiny Rossii] Alevtina Fedulova, Yekaterina Lakhova, Galina Klimantova, Marina Dobrovolskaya, Fanuza Arslanova, Irina Vybornova, Antonina Zhilina, Lyudmila Zavadskaya, Natalya Malakhatkina, Svetlana Orlova, Galina Parshentseva, Yelena Chepurnykh. (Federal list published 28 October).

Agrarian Party of Russia [Agrarnaya partiya Rossii] Mikhail Lapshin, Aleksandr Nazarchuk, Vasiliy Starodubtsev, Aleksandr Davydov, Aleksandr Zaveryukha, Vladimir Akatyev, Aleksandr Belashov, Nikolay Sukhoy, Anatoliy Vorontsov, Andrey Popov, Mikhail Trunov, Vladimir Isakov. (Federal list published 28 October).

Russia is Our Home [Nash dom—Rossiya] Viktor Chernomyrdin, Nikita Mikhalkov, Lev Rokhlin, Sergey Belyayev, Daniya Karimova, Zhores Alferov, Galina

Volchek, Nikolay Travkin, Vladimir Kinelev, Vladimir Bashmachnikov, Aleksandr Martynov, Vladimir Ryzhkov. (Federal list published 31 October)

Trade Unions and Industrialists of Russia—Union of Labor [Profsoyuzy i promyshlenniki Rossii—Soyuz Truda] Vladimir Shcherbakov, Mikhail Shmakov, Arkadiy Volskiy, Valeriy Trapeznikov, Dmitriy Lukashenko, Aleksandr Neumyvakin, Valeriy Nosov, Yuriy Sakharnov, Anatoliy Denisov, Vadim Zhimirov, Igor Yurgens, Valeriy Bagin. (Federal list published 1 November)

Ivan Rybkin's Bloc [Blok Ivana Rybkina] Ivan Rybkin, Yuriy Petrov, Artur Chilingarov, Vyacheslav Nikonov, Aleksandra Ochirova, Aleksandr Sergeyev, Vyacheslav Lashchevskiy, Valeriy Kirpichnikov, Sergey Rodionov, Sergey Trakhirov, Igor Shichanin, Pavel Borodin. (Federal list published 2 November)

Beer Lovers' Party [Partiya lyubitelyey piva] Konstantin Kalachev, Dmitriy Shestakov, Andrey Palchevskiy, Andrey Kunitsyn, Yuriy Pripachkin, Aleksandr Levchenko, Aleksandr Shuvayev, Vyacheslav Krusser, Yuriy Milyukov, Nikolay Vlasov, Maksim Listovskiy, Andrey Artyushkov. (Federal list published 2 November)

List of Single-Seat Electoral Districts

The list of the 225 single-seat districts for the 17 December elections was published in Rossiyskaya Gazeta (22 August) and Rossiyskiye Vesti (24 August). It lists each district's name and number; the total number of voters; the district's center; and other cities, towns, and rayons in the district.

Election Schedule — Key Dates

15 November-15 December: Equal and free access for airtime on state-owned federal and regional television and radio channels granted for all candidates; 30-minute blocs of free airtime from 7:00-10:00 and 18:00-23:30 to be drawn by lots.

Popov Interviewed on Social Democrats' Credo

MM0711185995 Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 4 Nov 95 p 2

[Interview with Gavriil Popov, a leader of the Social Democrats, by Vladimir Kokorin; place and date not given: "Civil Defense Against Bureaucracy. For the First Time Since 1917, Social Democrats Are Entering Elections in Russia. A Leader of the [Social Democrats'

Electoral] Association, Gavriil Popov, Answers Our Correspondent's Questions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kokorin] How do you explain the fact that the transition from the system of the planned economy to the market system is being accompanied by such a pronounced and protracted slump in production?

[Popov] Everything is not so simple here. The market system has proved its undoubted efficiency by comparison with the feudal economy. In Marx' day it revealed both its dynamism and its insoluble contradictions. And it had already become clear by the beginning of the century that the market system in its capitalist version cannot exist.

Since then, all mankind's efforts have been channeled in one direction: to introduce organizing principles into the market system. The state's intrusion has taken three forms: international socialism (the Leninist version), national socialism (fascism), and F. Roosevelt's New Deal (based on Keynesian models), which culminated in the construction of a socially oriented market economy with extensive state regulation.

The historic fate of all three systems is well known. National socialism was defeated in the war. International, Leninist socialism, having passed through a phase of internal conflicts (with Yugoslavia and China), had by 1990 also revealed its bankruptcy. At the same time, postindustrial society — more often than not involuntarily, under the pressure of external and internal circumstances — absorbed many of the achievements of its totalitarian rivals: free education and health care, a system of social protection for the population. A quite influential state sector was created in it, and a very subtle mechanism of state regulation was perfected.

This does not mean, of course, that everything now runs smoothly. The contradictions of postindustrial society are now intensifying. During the period of conflict with the socialist camp, these contradictions were stifled. But in the future, many conflicts will arise. The case of Yugoslavia or Iraq is only the beginning.

[Kokorin] Gavriil Kharitonovich, all three of these versions of overcoming the contradictions of the market economy mean increasing bureaucracy. Can this really not be avoided?

[Popov] Of course not. The role of bureaucracy as a necessary element in any organization constantly increases. And the increased role of organization is linked with the solution of many problems: ecological safety, the promotion of science, culture, and sport, and so forth. An indirect sign of the increasing role of bureaucracy is the growth of bribery and corruption.

However, in the course of society's development, counterbalances to bureaucracy have been maintained. These are political democracy, the institution of private property, and nonstate structures in the economy and in education and health care. The share of private property, in the strict sense of the term, in postindustrial society is not great — around 30 percent — but this is sufficient in order to overcome the inertness of bureaucracy, to safeguard the dynamism of society, and to preserve a base for politicians independent of the state.

[Kokorin] Could you give a general outline of the problems facing Russia today?

[Popov] We need to move away from state socialism to some version of postindustrial society. Western countries are trying to impose on Russia a model for backward countries, to make Russia a raw-materials adjunct. This does not mean poverty, still less destitution, for Russia. But it undoubtedly means a secondary status in world politics. Such a model does not suit us because of the historical peculiarities of our development. Russia was formed as a great power, and it will be impossible for it to reconcile itself to a secondary status. In my opinion, not only does the model of postindustrial Chile or Korea not suit Russia, but nor do any of the existing models of the developed countries — neither the American model, nor the European model, nor the Japanese model. We need our own model of postindustrial society.

So far, unfortunately, the model being implemented does not correspond to Russia's conditions. Hence, first of all, the growth in the difficulties of the transitional period which were already inevitable. Transition as such is not the issue, but the methods of transition. Transition will be necessary all the same, whoever is in power. The option with relatively the least difficulties — the Chinese version of transition — was squandered. The CPSU elite could not cope with this task. There remained the conflict version.

The country was not ready for this. First, no model for development had been elaborated. It is impossible to consider what was proposed by N.I. Ryzhkov or the "500 Days" plan as serious models. The intelligentsia did not believe that anything could change in their lifetime, and the question of models for the future seemed to them to be pointless. They did not believe that they would have to resolve not only the question of the removal of the CPSU, but also the question of an alternative strategy. The second factor was that Russian bureaucracy as a single class never existed. There were several strata, with the controlling stratum in the form of the CPSU apparatus. And as soon as this controlling stratum had been destroyed, the

heterogeneous nature of the bureaucracy was revealed. It split into bureaucratic sectors: the military-industrial complex, the agro-industrial complex, and the central and local bureaucracies of the national republics and autonomies.

The fragmented nature of the Russian bureaucracy meant that it was not really able to implement even the course that was chosen. This fragmented nature still exists, and the attempt to create "Our Home" is clear proof of this.

One would have thought that the liberal bureaucracy represented by Ye. Gaydar, V. Fedorov, and G. Yavlinskiy, would have been able somehow to unite. But it found itself splintered. The position in the ranks of the old communist bureaucracy is no better. It also could not form a united bloc.

This is why I do not see any serious subjective factors today which would allow the course of the reforms to be changed in the near future, although objectively speaking, the question has long since been in urgent need of solution.

[Kokorin] But all the same, what, in your view, should be Russia's development model?

[Popov] The actual model should be the result of consensus [dogovorennost], and at the present time we should not speak of it. But, theoretically, the scheme should include the following.

First. A new foreign policy. The idea that the West as a whole is dreaming of how it might help us is utopian. We must discard the idea that it is possible to agree with the West as a whole, and move toward a pragmatic concept for relying on one of the rival groups. We must seek strategic allies, similar to the way in which after 1905 the Czarist government chose the [Triple] Entente [the triple alliance of Britain, France, and Russia against the German-led coalition]. At the same time, we should be aware that our future ally needs a strong Russia. That means that we need a powerful army and an efficient military-industrial complex. Without this we cannot live in the 21st century.

Second. The CIS. Here the following decision is essential: to move away from a general stereotype. We need to isolate certain spheres of cooperation. First — the zone of intensive integration — ruble and military integration — with, for instance, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Right now only Russia opposes this. Our country is still dominated by those who think that Russia can carry out reforms more easily on its own.

Third. A political mechanism. Here there are several serious problems. The main thing is to understand the

nature of the Russian Federation. It is mistaken to imagine that the free expression of will and the agreement of all the federation components should lie at the basis of the Russian Federation. Russia was not historically formed by means of consensus. The Muscovite state annexed territories by force, by cajolment, through money, through the church, and so on. Therefore, concessions to the regions and autonomies which are too great contradict Russia's essential nature. At the same time, given the size of Russia, any centralist administration is doomed. Therefore, it is necessary to create a new federation — but not a treaty-based federation — with leading role for the center, in which the extensive autonomy of the regions is combined with a firm, controlling vertical structure.

Fourth. Economic policy. We must get the state sector back on its feet and determine what form it should take. Further, we must define the scale and the forms of state regulation with regard to the whole economy. We must define the stages of market transition for those sectors which should be purely market-led.

But behind all this, in my view, lies a still more important problem. I think that Russia will scarcely manage to exist as an element of the world market. Russia is too big. The system of "interdependencies" [blok "vzaimopokrytiy"] is extensive. Prices within this sphere should not necessarily be at world level. If, for example, we "crush" the countryside with world prices, the cost of resettling, training, and supporting the unemployed could outweigh the benefits of importing cheaper meat or milk. We need to build an open market economy that combines a certain degree of self-containment. This, incidentally, is one of the major problems of the Russian model of postindustrialism.

The issue of privatization also needs to be decided. Wholesale mistakes have been committed here. We must not privatize enterprises, wrenching them from their place in the production sequence. In the upshot, both their partners and they themselves perish. The sector principle should be paramount.

A further point. Following privatization, competition should arise in the sector, otherwise privatization will not stimulate growth.

Another important factor. The state should compensate citizens for losses incurred by the voucher-based property transfer. After all, it was the state that implemented it. And, finally, income from privatization should not go toward the needs of the bureaucracy, but to provide credits for the private sector.

A final point. If a bureaucratic system is created, if the bureaucracy itself creates such a system, it will

also seek to create advantages for itself. That means the most important task right now — the task which the Social Democrats set themselves — is the task of civil defense against bureaucracy during the reforms. Against any bureaucracy — against the bureaucracy which is in power and the bureaucracy that aspires to power. What is needed are not defense measures, but a defense mechanism. It will include protecting pay against inflation, compensating savings, a certain degree of control over prices, and the protection of those who gave many years of work to the construction of the socialist state, while receiving pay with deductions for expenditure on housing, medical treatment, and training.

In general, as can see, the Social Democrats are promoting two tasks: first, changing the actual strategy of the reforms, and second, creating a mechanism to protect the interests of the majority of the people, who do not form part of the bureaucracy.

CRC's Glazyev Rejects Rumors of Communist Alliance

*LD0611150695 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1420 GMT 6 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Nov 6 (INTERFAX) — A leader of the Congress of Russian Communities [CRC] and the chairman of the Duma economic reform committee Sergey Glazyev dismissed as "scholastic" all talk of a possible alliance with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

It is legally impossible to create new electoral alliances now that the elections are around the corner, Glazyev told INTERFAX Monday.

CRC and Communist representatives met to discuss only the removal of the present government, he said.

The Congress is still waiting for "a coherent answer that would clear up the Communist view of the matter in question."

Zhirinovskiy, Communists To Cooperate in Elections

*LD0611211195 Moscow NTV in Russian
1900 GMT 6 Nov 95*

[Video report by Mikhail Osokin; from the "Segodnya" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] As the elections draw nearer, ever stranger combinations are arising. For instance, according to the newspaper KURANTY, the Communist Party and Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia have held secret consultations about putting forward candidates in single-mandate constituencies. According to the report, the consultations were aimed at

ensuring that the Communist and Zhirinovskiy candidates who have a chance of success should not compete against each other.

CPRF's Zyuganov Cited on Meeting With Premier
MM0611134395 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
4 Nov 95 p 2

["Own Information" report: "Zyuganov-Chernomyrdin: Discussion on Equal Footing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Gennadiy Zyuganov, chairman of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Central Committee, and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin had a meeting. What did they discuss? This is what Gennadiy Zyuganov said:

"I have just returned from a tour of the Far East, West Siberia, and the Urals. The situation is complex. But now only the 'democrats' benefit from stirring up the situation and thwarting the elections. I told the premier this and reminded him of the need to comply with all the security regulations in order to ensure that the October celebrations are calm.

"We also discussed the problems of preparing for winter and food supplies. I asked him to explain why the mass media have begun to scare people by saying that a loaf of bread will cost 10,000 rubles.

"There are tricky problems — winter is coming, there is no fuel for heating, and the granaries are empty. There are disturbances in Bryansk, there was previously trouble in Kovrov. The government must realize how this may end. These problems must be resolved. It was a discussion on an equal footing. We both agreed that the State Duma elections must go ahead."

CPRF Details Election Donations Procedures
MM0711163495 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 4 Nov 95 p 1

[Unattributed feature: "CPRF Is Counting on Your Help in Election Run-Up"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with the numerous messages to the headquarters of the "Communist Party of the Russian Federation" [CPRF] electoral association and the CPRF Central Executive Committee about the procedure for transfers [of funds] for election purposes we report the following: Under Federal Law No. 90-F3 of 21 June 1995 "On the Election of Deputies to the Russian Federation Federal Assembly State Duma," candidates for State Duma deputy and electoral associations (blocs) can set up their own monetary election funds to finance election campaigning. Election fund resources are kept in special temporary accounts at Russian Federation Savings Bank branches. The

right to dispose of election fund resources for the said purposes is vested exclusively in the candidate or electoral association (bloc) that set up this fund.

Procedure for Setting Up Election Funds

Funds of Candidates for Deputy (Only for Single-Seat Districts)

Election funds for candidates for deputy can be set up from the following monetary resources:

- resources allocated to the candidate for election campaigning by the district electoral commission which registered him;

- the candidate's own resources, whose total cannot exceed 43.7 million rubles [R];

- resources allocated to the candidate by the electoral association (bloc) which nominated him and whose total cannot exceed R65.55 million;

- voluntary donations from physical and legal persons.

A physical person's total donation cannot exceed R874,000.

A legal person's total donation cannot exceed R8.74 million.

The maximum amount spent by a candidate for deputy from the electoral fund's resources cannot exceed R437 million.

Electoral Associations' Funds

Electoral associations' (blocs') funds can be set up from the following monetary resources:

- resources allocated to the electoral association (bloc) for election campaigning by the appropriate electoral commission;

- the electoral association's (bloc's) own resources, whose total cannot exceed R4.370 million;

- voluntary donations from physical and legal persons.

A physical person's total donation cannot exceed R1.311 million.

A legal person's total donation cannot exceed R87.4 million.

The maximum sum spent by an electoral association (bloc) from the election fund's resources cannot exceed R10.925 million [amount as published].

The Following Are Not Permitted:

donations to the election funds of candidates for deputy and electoral associations (blocs) from:

- foreign states, organizations, and citizens;
- persons not having citizenship;
- Russian legal persons with foreign participation, *if the proportion of foreign capital in their incorporation capital exceeds 30 percent*;
- international organizations and international public movements;
- organs of local self-government and state and municipal enterprises, institutions, and organizations;
- military units, establishments, and organizations;
- charitable organizations and religious associations.

Legal persons are to transfer donations to election funds by standard banker's payment order, making the following note in the section "Purpose of Payment...": **"Voluntary donation to the 'CPRF' Electoral Association. The proportion of foreign capital in incorporation capital is nil (or 30 percent, 15 percent, 10 percent, and so on — as applicable)."**

In accordance with Instruction No. 01-308 of October 1995 on the procedure for transferring monetary resources to electoral associations' accounts, the following procedure for drawing up payment documents has been established for physical persons.

Physical persons residing *in Moscow and Moscow Oblast*, when transferring donations to the "CPRF" Electoral Association's account, must without fail **complete a credit slip (Form No. 51) and a cash contribution declaration receipt (Form No. 31) at a Russian Federation Savings Bank branch, indicating that this is a voluntary donation.** On the reverse side of the credit slip and receipt they must give their passport details or details from the document replacing it, place of residence, and surname, name, and patronymic (in full).

Voluntary donations from physical persons residing *in other cities and regions* **are to be made according to the procedure established for the transfer of cash to be entered on deposit.** The payment order must indicate the donor's surname, name, and patronymic (in full) and include his place of residence and passport details.

Attention: If the conditions listed above are not complied with, the donations will not reach the electoral association's account and will be transferred to the Central Electoral Commission as revenue for the state.

Banker's Details for Donations

1. To the party's fund

For Moscow and Moscow Oblast: Moscow, Avtobank, current account 700807, sort code 998985.

For the regions: CPRF Central Executive Committee, current account 700807, Russian Federation Central Bank Central Operations Administration, Avtobank, Moscow, correspondent account 774161800, sort code 299112.

Postal address: Avtobank, 101514, Moscow, Ulitsa Lesnaya, No. 41

2. To the CPRF's election fund

For Moscow and Moscow Oblast: Moscow, Russian Savings Bank Moscow Branch Central Administration, current account IB 700101, correspondent account 164246 at the Russian Federation Central Bank Moscow Branch Operations Administration, Moscow City, participant VA, sort code 201906.

For the regions: current account IB 700101, correspondent account 164246 at the Russian Federation Central Bank Moscow Branch Operations Administration, correspondent account 342161600 at the Russian Federation Central Bank Main Administration Main Regional Cash Center, Moscow City, participant 83, sort code 201791.

Postal address: Russian Federation Savings Bank Moscow Branch Central Administration, 109544, Moscow, B. Andronyevskaya Street, 8/10, Russian Federation Savings Bank Moscow Branch.

Regional Activities

Zhirinovskiy Meets With Vladikavkaz Constituents

LD0611133895 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
1242 GMT 6 Nov 95

[By Valeriy Shanayev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] VLADIKAVKAZ, November 6 (Itar-Tass) — Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, a member of Russia's State Duma, the Lower House of the Russian Parliament, and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), made a one-day trip to Vladikavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia, on Monday.

The Chairman of the LDPR faction in the Duma met with constituents here at the Republican Technical Arts Centre. As usual, Zhirinovskiy made remarks, accusing the present leadership of Russia of all domestic and foreign-policy miscalculations.

It is noteworthy that at previous elections to the State Duma the Zhirinovskiy-led party polled the largest number of votes in North Ossetia. Local analysts believe the residents of the republic inhabited by members

of many nationalities, have cooled towards the LDPR leader. The Russia [Is] Our Home movement and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation are the LDPR's serious rivals here.

Forecasts & Commentary

Zyuganov Interviewed on Election Prospects

LD0711220495

[FBIS Editorial Report] Moscow NTV in Russian at 1635 GMT on 7 November in its 25-minute "Hero of the Day" program carries an interview with Gennadiy Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, by Yevgeniy Kiselev on the 78th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

Kiselev says: "According to an official opinion poll conducted by the All-Russia Center for Public Opinion Research, 40 percent of citizens of the Russian Federation polled take a positive view of the Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917; 33 percent of respondents regarded it in a negative light. In all, the majority of Russian Federation citizens below the age of 40 who were polled have a negative view of the revolution, whereas the majority of representatives of the older generation view it positively. Furthermore, in the poll, Russian Federation citizens intending to vote for the Communist Party, the Agrarian Party, and the Russia Is Our Home bloc regard the revolution in a positive light. Supporters of Yabloko, the Ivan Rybkin bloc, the Party of Working People's Self-Government, Russia's Choice, and the Congress of Russian Communities take a negative view of the revolution."

Asked about the public attitude to the revolution and the horrors of the Stalinist period, Zyuganov says history must not be reduced merely to the mistakes made in the past, which the Communist Party has admitted; account must be taken of the huge successes achieved. The holiday does not celebrate the victory of one class over another, but is a grand celebration of unity and reconciliation.

Kiselev states that, ahead of the elections, the pro-communist press has been building up Zyuganov's image, focusing on portraying him in a human light. In the "Itogi" programme popularity ratings, Zyuganov rose from 10th position in April to seventh in October, though in the running for the presidential election he lags behind Yeltsin, Lebed, Yavlinskiy, and Chernomyrdin.

Asked if he is planning to run for president, Zyuganov replies: "The task we have set is to get through the elections and form a popular patriotic majority in the State Duma." He continues: "You understand, our program envisages two stages — the elections to the

Duma, and the subsequent presidential elections. We regard this as an uninterrupted process. The aim is to form a bloc which will make it possible to cut out both the madmen on the left and the lunatics on the right." He says: "Then, from this bloc situation, we shall hold a meeting and propose an option to emerge from the crisis."

In response to Kiselev's question as to who the partners in the bloc are, Zyuganov states: "I'll tell you in a minute. We can propose a government of national confidence, that's the first thing; formulate our strategy at the elections; and propose a team — the president, prime minister, deputy prime ministers, and key ministers. In that team, I am ready to fulfill the role we agree on."

Kiselev asks: "But what if, for example, your party congress were to decide that Petr Romanov, for instance, a Federation Council member and a director from Krasnoyarsk, is a better candidate than Zyuganov, would you be prepared to accept that?"

Zyuganov replies: "I shall carry out the will of the big coalition. But during this campaign, we have brought into our selected united bloc communists, nonparty people, and representatives of the intelligentsia. We say we are ready to hold negotiations with anyone who agrees that Russia should not fall apart, that there should be no war in Russia, and that there should be prosperity in every home."

Zyuganov adds: "We are prepared to hold consultations, and we are in fact conducting them with the Congress of Russian Communities, even though they have said that is not so." He goes on to say that consultations on a range of issues have taken place, though things had not yet gone as far as putting forward joint candidates.

The elections are set for 17 December, Kiselev says. "We are not yet wholly certain of that," Zyuganov states, adding that if they do not take place, the situation will deteriorate sharply. Asked about party finances, Zyuganov says the party's finances come from membership dues and a 5,000-ruble contribution from each member; the campaign will be very cheap. Zyuganov declines to say whether the party is getting money from private business, though he says that the party has appealed to all sources.

"There is no normal democratic power in Russia today," Zyuganov declares. "The services have been tasked with finding out even what I eat for breakfast. I lift the telephone receiver in the mornings and say: Hello, lads! It's shameful to eavesdrop on me, I'm a member of the State Duma. They say: We report back all day on the bosses' instructions."

In response to Kiselev's expressed surprise at this, Zyuganov says: "I've been dealing for many years with the special services, the army, the prosecutor's office, the militia — I know their work well. Unfortunately, in this respect the powers that be violate elementary norms." Kiselev asks: "Are you followed? Are you regularly shadowed?" Zyuganov replies: "That happens, too."

Zyuganov refuses to be drawn on exactly which services eavesdrop on him and follow him, telling Kiselev: "They can tell you themselves." This, Zyuganov said, "is real democracy for you, when everyone answers for his own actions and deeds, and is not afraid to do so."

Zyuganov goes on to say that the communists did well in elections in Volgograd, Orel, Bryansk, Vladimir, and elsewhere, and are confident of strengthening their position in the December elections and of obtaining well over 10 percent of the votes in some places.

Asked again if he intends to run for president in 1996, Zyuganov says: "The leader of a major party does not have the right to rule that out, if he is a serious man and a responsible politician. I advocate going out with a strong team and of playing in that team the role I am capable of."

Kremlin Denies Yeltsin Seeking Medical Treatment Abroad

AU0811090395 *Paris AFP in English*
0836 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Moscow, Nov 8 (AFP) — The Kremlin denied a report by CNN television Wednesday [8 November] that Russian President Boris Yeltsin was so ill that aides were considering getting him medical treatment outside Russia.

"We do not have that information," a Kremlin spokesman told AFP.

"Yesterday, his condition was stable. The treatment continues. All is going well and he is meeting with people," the spokesman said.

CNN reported that U.S. State Department sources were deeply concerned by Yeltsin's health and that aides and the 64-year-old president's wife were debating whether he should leave Russia for treatment.

Yeltsin's wife was also reported to oppose his bid for a second term in the June 1996 presidential elections.

The Kremlin spokesman said he had no last-minute information on Yeltsin, who was beginning his third week in hospital for ischemia, a condition that restricts the flow of blood to the heart. [passage omitted]

Peace Process Said To Continue Despite Rabin's Death

LD0811145795 *Moscow INTERFAX in English*
1317 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Nov 8 (INTERFAX) — The tragic death of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin must not affect the Middle Eastern peace negotiations, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Posuvalyuk said Wednesday in an interview with INTERFAX.

Posuvalyuk hailed Shim'on Peres' commitment to the regional peace strategy.

Posuvalyuk was paying a working visit to Cairo when Rabin was killed. He left Cairo for Jerusalem where he joined the Russian delegation to Rabin's funeral.

Israeli leaders assured the Russian delegation of their commitment to the policy of expanding bilateral relations which "were quite dynamic in the years of the Rabin government," said Posuvalyuk.

The Russian delegation led by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Israeli leaders agreed to continue political dialogue on the widest variety of issues, Posuvalyuk said.

Posuvalyuk was confident that the Rabin assassination will "consolidate those forces of Israel which stand for a dialogue with the Arab world."

He saw the dialogue between Israel and Syria and Lebanon as decisive in the context of the Middle Eastern negotiating process. In its capacity as co-sponsor of the search for a Middle Eastern settlement, Russia will continue to render all-round assistance to the promotion of that dialogue, Posuvalyuk said.

Moscow hopes the Peres Cabinet will meet its pledges under the Israeli-Palestinian agreement.

Moscow Declares Command of Russian Troops in Bosnia

LD0811151295 *Moscow INTERFAX in English*
1317 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BRUSSELS, Nov 8 (INTERFAX) — The Russian military contingent, which may participate in peace-making operations in Bosnia, should be directly subordinate to Moscow, a member of the Russian delegation arriving in Brussels for talks with U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry told INTERFAX Monday.

The delegation is headed by Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev.

Moscow is ready for "operational and tactical coordination" of actions of its peace-makers with the U.S. military command, said the source. However, decisions on these actions will not be taken by NATO.

Moscow is ready to send a paratrooper brigade with a strength of up to 3,000 to the Yugoslav conflict zone, he said.

Grachev and Perry are expected to make a final decision regarding the command structure in Bosnia. But this may not happen at the Brussels meeting, said the source.

"It is important that a decision on forms of Moscow participation in the Balkan operation be taken by the NATO Council, despite the fact the United States is a leading member of NATO," he noted.

"Preliminary contacts with Bonn, London and Paris show their governments would like to see Russian peace-makers in the Balkans," said the source.

Moscow sources told INTERFAX that the Russian Defense Minister received presidential instructions over the telephone regarding Russia's stand on the Balkan operation before his departure for Brussels.

"The president instructed the minister to take a principled stand at negotiations with due account of Russia's status and influence in the region," stressed the sources.

Yushenkov on U.S. Command of Russian Troops

LD0811102595 Moscow *INFORMATSIONNOYE*
AGENTSTVO EKHO MOSKVY in Russian
0926 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sergey Yushenkov, chairman of the Russian Federation State Duma defense committee, thinks "the question of Russian troops participating in peacekeeping activities in the former Yugoslavia will be finally resolved."

"In my opinion, the proposal that a U.S. general be commander of the Russian peacekeeping subunit and that his first deputy be a Russian general may well go through," Sergey Yushenkov told Moscow Echo radio station. "In my opinion, this is quite acceptable. A great deal depends upon what decision is taken in the United States. I don't yet know how ready they are to accept this formula."

Let us recall that a meeting between Russian Defense Pavel Grachev and U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry will take place in Brussels on 8 November on questions of the formation of the international contingent of peacekeeping forces in Bosnia with Russian participation.

Moscow's Role in Bosnian Crisis Assessed

AU0711131595 Budapest *NEPSZABADSAG*
in Hungarian 4 Nov 95 p 7

[Interview with Pavel Kandel, researcher of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Europe Institute, by Gabor Horvath; in Moscow, date not given: "How Great Is Russia's Role in Bosnia?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russia is making great efforts not to be completely left out of any Balkan settlement. Our correspondent interviewed Pavel Kandel, a leading researcher of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Europe Institute and one of the most distinguished experts on this issue in Moscow, on the chances for this.

[Horvath] War or peace? What does winter hold for Bosnia?

[Kandel] The balance of power has changed for the first time in four years. Serb superiority had been the greatest obstacle to peace hitherto. However, the Croatian-Muslim [Bosnia-Herzegovina Army] offensive and the NATO airstrikes have forced the Serbs to accept the peace plan. Now the current territorial division also resembles the suggested map, so there is cause for optimism. The Serbs have grown tired of the war, while almost everything has been returned to the Croats, and Milosevic, to my greatest surprise, is even returning eastern Slavonia. The Bosnian Government is at the moment the party least interested in peace, as is shown

by its behavior, but Izetbegovic cannot do much on his own. If the West puts pressure on him and Russia does not incite the Serbs into further fighting, then a rare moment will come about in the history of the Balkan conflict: There will be the conditions for peace.

[Horvath] What could disturb this process?

[Kandel] All peace plans leave fundamentally important issues open, for example, the state structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina, although this is precisely the reason the war broke out. Naturally, it would be good to see the establishment of a Bosnia in which the three basic nations live in friendship, but there is little chance of this because, during the four years of the war, all the sides have committed unforgivable crimes against one another and against humanity. It would be best to partition the country with the least amount of pain. There is a chance for solution if the superpowers at least agree on this. If the West and the United States want to achieve the maximal goals and want to force the Serbs out of Bosnia, then war will again break out, possibly for the last time, but in its severest form. In that case, the Bosnian Serbs will fight bitterly and Yugoslavia will not be able to remain idle, either, because there will be refugees fleeing there.

[Horvath] Russia's influence on the Balkan events has considerably diminished in recent months. What role awaits Russia in the region?

[Kandel] In recent months, Russia has indeed been pushed into the background and its positions have weakened. However, this does not mean that it cannot play any role and it has lost all its influence. The situation is made worse by the fact that those whom it considered its allies, namely the Serbs in Bosnia and Yugoslavia, completely ignored its views after a while. As their interests changed, they simply agreed with the United States. Naturally, this could easily be predicted, it is politics. Nevertheless, it is easier for the Serbs to accept the peace plan if Russia, as a counterbalance, is among the powers providing the guarantees. On the other hand, should the Serbs decide on war, it is important whether Russia calms or incites them. Russia's role can be important, even if not as important as believed by the Kremlin.

[Horvath] How realistic is the possibility of Russia participating in the Balkan settlement with a significant military force?

[Kandel] It is known that Russia has offered a division but does not have the money to maintain such a large unit. Therefore, it would like someone else to pay for the division, but, at the same time, it does not want to put it under foreign command. The situation is rather

controversial and it is unlikely that anything can be changed before the December elections; and after that, with a new Duma, it will be even more difficult. Some time is needed for everyone to realize that Russia simply cannot allow itself to confront the West, because its economic background is not solid enough for this.

[Horvath] Is it possible that the Balkans will be the first proof of this?

[Kandel] It already is. After all, the West has proved that it can manage without the Russians. The opposite of this is not true.

Caspian Shelf Exploration 10 Miles From Baku Threatened

LD0711173895 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1631 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Nov 7 (INTERFAX) — Russia may legally prospect for and explore Caspian offshore oil fields 10 miles away from Baku even tomorrow, the director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's legal department, Aleksandr Khodakov, told INTERFAX.

At the same time, he underlined that Russia will not resort to such extreme measures "not to complicate the settlement of the Caspian status issue and the relations between the Caspian states (Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan — IF note)."

According to Khodakov, "the existing Soviet-Iranian treaties of 1921 and 1940 do not settle all issues arising in exploration of Caspian resources." "These documents extended upon shipping and fishing, but left out of the scope the exploration of mineral resources," he added.

Khodakov said the issue was not deadlocked, though he admitted that the Caspian states had principal differences. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan support sharing out the Caspian Sea by national sectors, while Russia, Iran and Turkmenistan oppose.

This is why it is too early to convoke any serious international forum to work out any solution to the Caspian issue, he said. "What is the use of such a forum, if there is no understanding as to what it should result in?" he asked rhetorically.

Japan To Build Far East Nuclear Waste Processing Plant

LD0811110395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1035 GMT 8 Nov 95

[By Veronika Romanenkova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, November 8 (ITAR-TASS) — Russia and Japan are completing

preparations for signing a contract on the construction of a facility in the Russian Far East for processing of liquid radioactive waste.

The construction of the facility will begin after the contract is signed and is expected to be completed in ten months, said Viktor Kutsenko, chief of the ecology department of the Russian Ministry for the Environment and Natural Resources.

The construction of the nuclear waste processing complex is carried out on a competitive basis. Several months ago the Japanese "Tomen" company became a winner at a trading session for the right to build the processing installation. Under the contract signed by the Japanese company and which was estimated at around 28 billion roubles, the installation is to process up to 7,000 cubic meters of liquid radioactive waste a year.

Funds needed for the construction of the facility will be allocated by the Japanese government in aid to Russia. These funds are part of the allocations to have been provided to the former Soviet Union under the 100-million dollar deal envisaging the dismantling of Soviet nuclear weapons.

Apart from the Russo-Japanese deal, Russia has been working at the creation of its own installation, which is being tested now and which has helped fully remove radioactive waste from the THT-5 tanker of the Russian Navy. The Russian-made installation can process one cubic meter of liquid waste per hour, Kutsenko said.

Nevertheless, the installation cannot fully resolve the problem of disposing of around 2,000 cubic meters of radioactive waste reportedly accumulated in the Far East by now. The installation can reduce the volume of radioactive waste, but as a result of its processing a more active substance is formed. Therefore, Russian experts are pinning their hopes on the future Japanese nuclear processing installation whose construction will soon begin.

Journalists Protest Tax Convention with France

MM0711143595 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Nov 95 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Russia Could Soon Be Without Correspondents in Paris"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A group of Russian correspondents in France has sent a letter to Vitaliy Ignatenko, vice premier and general director of ITAR-TASS, and to the chief editors of the major mass media.

The journalists could be in a grave material position if the new tax convention initialed during Boris Yeltsin's recent visit to France is ratified by the two countries'

parliaments. Under existing rules Russian correspondents in France and French correspondents in Russia are exempt from the payment of tax for the first two years of their tours abroad. In fact the exemption usually extended to their entire stay. In accordance with the new convention journalists will have to pay taxes just 18 months after arriving in the country.

Recently the French authorities demanded that IZVESTIYA correspondent Yuriy Kovalenko pay taxes for the four preceding years from all sums earmarked by the editorial office for the maintenance of the correspondents' center. A similar fate soon awaits other Russian journalists.

The letter says that despite the Russian Embassy's suggestion that tax practice be left untouched the Russian and French finances ministries have not deemed it necessary to make an exception for correspondents in the text of the convention.

As long as the document has not been signed or ratified there is a hope of making the necessary changes to it. A session of the Russian-French council for bilateral cooperation headed by Vice Premier Sergey Shakhrai and French Minister of Economics, Finance, and Planning Jean Arthuis, who will be received by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, will be held in Moscow 9-10 November. In the Russian capital it would be possible to reach agreement on the inclusion of an additional article in the convention or on the signing of a special protocol to it, the letter's authors believe. The journalists also ask the Russian authorities to ask the French about the exemption of the IZVESTIYA correspondent from payment of taxes for 1991-1994.

The letter has been signed, in addition to Yu. Kovalenko, by Yu. Lopatin, chief of the ITAR-TASS regional bureau; Ye. Lukyanov, chief of an ORT department; N. Vikhlyayev, chief of the RIA NOVOSTI bureau; TRUD correspondent V. Prokofyev; KOM-SOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent M. Chikin; ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent K. Privalov; and PRAVDA correspondent V. Bolshakov.

Nazarchuk Says Russia Should Join FAO in 1996-97

LD0711173795 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1631 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Nov 7 (INTERFAX) — Russian Agriculture and Food Minister Aleksandr Nazarchuk said Russia should join the Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], a U.N. agency, in 1996-1997.

A government commission is to be set up for this purpose, Nazarchuk, who headed the Russian delegation at FAO's anniversary session in Quebec, told INTERFAX.

Nazarchuk repeated that the USSR was among the 45 founder countries of this international organization 50 years ago but "refrained" from joining FAO. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were the first to join FAO after the dissolution of the USSR. The three Baltic states were followed by Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.

Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan applied for membership in FAO this year.

Nazarchuk said FAO itself was interested in having Russia among its members. He said FAO had decided to decrease the contribution for Russia from \$27 million to \$16-17 million.

IF Note: The U.S.' contribution to FAO is \$92 million.

Chairman of the Russian Fishing Committee Vladimir Korelskiy said he also favored Russia's joining FAO. He said Russia had only to draw up necessary documents because the Fishing Committee had been cooperating with FAO for a long time. Korelskiy said the Russian Fishing Committee in particular was receiving from FAO experts information regarding sea reserves, statistics concerning the world's fishing and trading on fish and fish products.

NATO Enlargement Issue Viewed

MM0711131295 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Nov 95 p 3

[Article by Stanislav Kondrashov: "Rubicon Remains To Be Crossed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the immediate and medium term, the question of NATO's expansion to the East will obviously be the main thorn in the side of mutual relations between Russia and the West. Their positions are specific. Russia is fiercely against it. NATO, headed by Washington, is specifically for it although with a temporary cooling period of three to five years, being in no hurry to announce specific dates and the order in which new members will be admitted. Time is being given to Russia to grow accustomed to it and to digest it considering the development of its domestic political situation and to the states of Central and East Europe [TsVYe] that are candidate members to ingratiatingly eat the new leadership with their eyes before joining the NATO ranks.

If we take a close look the present dispute between Moscow and Brussels and Washington is of a strange nature. The participants of the dispute do not include those who have become the bone of contention or as

one might say in the spirit of new acronyms the flower [TsVYetok] of contention. They do not include Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Bratislava, and so forth. The Soviet leadership at the meeting of two eras when the Berlin Wall and the once monolithic structures of the Warsaw Pact Organization were being destroyed for some reason did not burden the then pliant Washington and the even more grateful Bonn with guarantees against NATO's advance to the East although at that time it was easy to get them. Later the Russian leadership, looking with fascination across the ocean where initially it saw not simply permanent partners but also permanent allies, missed and closed its ears to the fact that nearby, in its underbelly, there had begun what was at first a timid political and psychological movement presaging a radical change of strategic milestones for all Central and Eastern Europe.

And it happened that Boris Yeltsin, while he was changing his friend George (Bush) for his friend Bill, had no time to bother with his friend Lech or his friend Vaclav although all three are Slavs and all appear to be democrats. And when his friends manques slipped away from Soviet patronage and moved toward American patronage (voluntarily, no one would drag them there by force) again the Moscow leadership had no time to work with them in a thoughtful and considered way. And the present quick-tempered talk with threats of a cold peace instead of a cold war is again being conducted over their heads.

Meanwhile the problem of NATO's expansion to the East is not only the age-old attraction of Central and Eastern Europe (and of Russia) toward real Europe but also the question of whether or not to trust Russia. Right now mistrust is obviously predominating. It has been caused by facts and even more by a sense of boundless chaos on the boundless post-Soviet expanses.

At the recent State Duma hearings devoted to Russia's relations with the Central and East European countries Polish Ambassador Czošek, although invited, did not speak. But he paid a sotto voce compliment to one speaker: "It is as though you were speaking in our name." What did Yuriy Davydov from the United States and Canada Institute say? He put more questions than he answered, but he asked the important questions. We do not want to admit these countries to NATO but what are we offering them? If they join Europe perhaps we will become closer to it? Perhaps it will be better for us too when NATO comes closer to Russia? Perhaps our generals fear NATO because in the member states civil control over military departments and military expenditure is compulsory?

Bold, almost seditious, unambiguous thoughts were expressed in the form of questions.

The answers were not given at the hearings, where the speaker who pleased the Polish ambassador spoke toward the end. First, other, more economic, issues prevailed. Second, there was no one to give answers. Russia has not acquired a clear-cut strategy in relations with the former Soviet allies nor a body which coordinates these relations.

Of course, one can accuse the Russian Foreign Ministry and Oleg Voronkov, deputy chief of the third European Department, was sent to take the rap for it. But the Foreign Ministry has neither sufficient powers nor experience of the above-mentioned coordination: After all, in former times it was primarily Staraya Square, in a special CPSU Central Committee section, which concerned itself with the socialist community countries. The section's powers came to an end back in those Gorbachev years when, as the influential veteran Vadim Zagladin, who was also invited to the conference, put it, our countries decided to "have a short rest from each other."

The "rest" turned into the collapse of relations at the crossroads between two eras. The vacuum in geopolitics anticipates the dissemination of a different influence on "easy prey." The small countries, having ceased to be the sphere of influence of one great power and, moreover, embarking on a new historical path, are coming under the influence of other great powers. Nature abhors a vacuum.

At open hearings in the State Duma committee for international affairs the sharp corners were smoothed rather than made sharper since representative Russian power has lost the right to make demands on the executive branch. Oleg Bogomolov, who was in the chair, and who is a deputy and academician and has extensive knowledge of the Central and East European countries, recalled that there were similar hearings about a year ago. The government reacted to their results with a formal reply and the Foreign Ministry responded with silence. This time they invited not only the ambassadors of the Central and East European countries accredited to Moscow but also the Russian ambassadors in the relevant capitals. They did not come. The Foreign Ministry explained they did not have the money to make the trip. And that was all. There was no money for tickets, not to mention keeping seven states — from Albania to the Czech republic — in our orbit. And you say NATO. And you are even surprised as to why this seven is prepared to rush there.

The simplest and chief explanations for what is happening lie in the tragicomedy surrounding us everywhere

and involving the transformation of the Soviet superstate into the Russian less-than-state. The underestimation of relations with the former satellite allies is naturally for a destitute less-than-state. It is just as natural for these former satellites to be drawn toward stable, wealthy, predictably democratic states. The "new Russians" who have made easy fortunes in the process of robbing the new state cannot, of course, serve as an opposite magnet.

Apart from anything else a destitute state has a parliament devoid of powers.

The anecdotal case of the absent ambassadors lent the discussion a certain leitmotif which was precisely defined by Vladimir Basov, deputy minister of education: "It would all be better with at least a minimum injections of filthy lucre." And he immediately gave an example from his department as an illustration. An agreement has been prepared with the Romanians on cooperation in the field of education. It has been prepared but not signed since the Russian delegation has not money to travel to Budapest [as published].

The Defense Ministry was represented by Pavel Zolotarev, chief of the analytical center. He took up the subject: In contrast to NATO with its partnership programs already in operation the Russian Defense Ministry does not have the money for joint exercises with its former comrades in arms. It is not even holding exercises of its own. In the military academies, including the General Staff academy, it is impossible now to find students from the Central and East European countries but Westerners, including Germans, are welcome guests because they pay for the training (the best in the world!) in hard currency.

But never mind military academies! Before the whole world our defense minister, meeting with the U.S. defense secretary, tries to persuade his counterpart to use U.S. dollars to back up the Russian application for the status of a great power. Surely that is the only interpretation for the persistent requests to finance the maintenance of the Russian contingent which it is planned to send to Bosnia within the framework of our joint NATO operation to "enforce peace?" And is the crux of the matter really altered by the stipulation that Russian soldiers will serve only under an American and not under a NATO general although this American general is also in command of all NATO forces in Europe?!

But let us return to our topic. The Russian obsession with thinking only in big terms and looking across the ocean and showing a great power's disregard for its closest neighbors is affecting everything. If we are seeking experience of reforms, it was said at the

hearings, then it is always somewhere in Kansas, where that experience is not to be found, and not in Warsaw or Prague, where the chronicle of failures and successes is still fresh. And even for the new Russian leftists as for those who are simply "new Russians" a chicken is not a bird. Bulgaria is not abroad and for some reason they have no wish to conduct dialogue on, for instance, the suitability or unsuitability on Russian soil of the Polish or Hungarian model for reforming the communist party.

This inclination was noted by Yevgeniy Kozhokin, who heads the institute of strategic studies. He pointed to the catastrophic decline in interest in the Russian language both in the Central and East European countries and in the CIS — a frightening sign that they are floating irretrievably away from Russia.

It is true that after the collapse of previous years over the last year there has been a certain positive advance in relations. But this stirring in the depths does not change the general trend toward reorientation toward the West.

As for joining NATO, according to assessments made in the depths of the Russian Foreign Ministry, all Central and East European countries without exception view this as their strategic goal. Their motives coincide — the desire to ensure national security under the conditions of geostrategic changes in the world. They are being increasingly active in implementing the "partnership for peace" working programs, seeing them as steps toward full membership.

In Albania the armed forces structures are being brought into line with NATO standards. This year eight joint exercises have taken place. Tirana has agreed to NATO naval and air bases on Albanian territory. Three U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft with about 100 personnel are being based there to keep track of events in the former Yugoslavia.

In Bulgaria President Zhelyu Zhelev, disagreeing with the government, is acting as the main initiator of entry into NATO and does not rule out the deployment of military bases, troops, and even nuclear weapons on Bulgarian territory.

Hungary would not like to anger Russia excessively and so is saying less, but is doing everything for practical cooperation with NATO.

In Poland the line toward joining NATO enjoys the support of all leading political groupings, including the left-wing forces, and is of a vividly expressed anti-Russian bent.

Romania is carrying out an extensive program of cooperation with NATO, comprehensively resolving

questions of the compatibility of its armed forces and military doctrine with NATO requirements.

Recently Slovakia has considerably activated contacts with NATO at all levels although the pragmatic premier Meciar, while advocating a foreign policy "extending in all directions," is in some respects distancing himself from President Kovac, who heads the supporters of the pro-NATO course.

The Czech republic is accelerating its army's rapprochement to NATO standards and is demanding with mounting insistence that together with Poland it be first in line for NATO membership. The Czechs explain their line by the presence of two threats to their sovereignty — from Russia and Germany — although they speak of the latter threat only confidentially.

Almost the most graphic demonstration of loyalty to NATO is the readiness voiced one way or another at official level of Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania to deploy NATO nuclear weapons on their territories. It should be noted that NATO is rejecting this show of loyalty as unnecessary in practice and moreover as aggravating Russia's anti-NATO suspicions.

...And so the die is cast — in the absence of any serious preventive work by Russia. And whether NATO's

expansion takes place now depends less on Moscow than on the military-political calculation of the plus and minus points in Washington and other NATO capitals.

NATO's advance toward Russian borders does not entail any direct military threat. The attempt to prove otherwise merely oversimplifies the crux of the matter. In our view the crux consists in new opportunities for military-political pressure on Russia, crudely speaking for its training. Of course for the sake of Russian advance along the path of reform and democracy but in those forms and only those forms that are acceptable to the West.

In the long term NATO influence on Ukraine could surpass Russian influence and the task of the admission of the Baltic states as additional members could become a relatively easy matter. In the long term NATO's role will also strengthen through the weakening of the Russian role in resolving inevitable conflicts in the post-Soviet space including conflicts connected with the fate of Russian minorities in Kazakhstan, Central Asia, or the Transcaucasus, for instance. We must wait and see: Then the instruments of "enforcing peace" which the United States now intends to test in Bosnia could also be suitable.

Political Issues**Yeltsin Said To Be Intensifying Working Schedule***LD0811112395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1052 GMT 8 Nov 95*

[By Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, November 8 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin, currently recovering from a mild heart trouble, is intensifying his working schedule, a spokesman said on Wednesday.

"Boris Yeltsin proceeds with increasing his work load," Sergey Medvedev told TASS, adding that the president had already met with his first aide Viktor Ilyushin and was holding another working meeting with Nationalities Minister Vyacheslav Mikhaylov and Interior Minister Anatoliy Kulikov.

Medvedev could not specify the agenda of the second meeting before its end, but said that apparently it was devoted to the settlement of the Chechen conflict.

Mikhaylov heads the Russian delegation at the Grozny peace talks, whereas Kulikov is in charge of interior troops stationed there.

Medvedev said that Yeltsin had established a new procedure of his contacts with aides. His first aide Ilyushin collects documents needing the president's attention and presents them to Yeltsin every day in a concentrated form. The president examines the received data and conveys his orders through Ilyushin.

Mikhaylov: Yeltsin Looks Well*LD0811135395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1337 GMT 8 Nov 95*

[By Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, November 8 (ITAR-TASS) — "(Russian President) Boris Yeltsin looks very well and is thoroughly informed about current events in Russia and the world," Minister of Nationalities Vyacheslav Mikhaylov said.

In an exclusive interview with ITAR-TASS on Wednesday, Mikhaylov said "our meeting lasted about an hour and, as far as I could judge, the president was ready to continue the conversation, but his doctors advise that he should not overload himself with work."

Mikhaylov visited the president, who is recovering from a heart attack in Moscow's Central Clinical Hospital, together with Interior Minister Anatoliy Kulikov.

"When we were there his doctor came in to measure his blood pressure and it was absolutely normal," Mikhaylov said.

**Yeltsin Fires Central Bank Acting Chief
Paramonova***LD0811130695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1239 GMT 8 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, November 8 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin on Wednesday signed a decree dismissing Tatyana Paramonova from the position of acting chairwoman of the Central Bank, a representative of the presidential press service told Tass.

Paramonova's first deputy Aleksandr Khandruyev has been appointed acting head of the Central Bank of Russia, the source added.

According to reliable sources in the Russian Government, President Boris Yeltsin and Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin discussed the problem of the Central Bank's leadership during their Friday meeting in the Central Clinical Hospital, devoted to personnel problems.

The State Duma (lower house of the Russian parliament) earlier several times refused to approve Paramonova in the position. Nevertheless she continued to discharge the functions of Central Bank acting chairwoman.

**Kozyrev Resignation, Ryurikov Succession Said
Ready***MM0811150495 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
9 Nov 95 p 2*

[Report by Yuliya Mikhaylova: "Andrey Kozyrev Not Signing Documents"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to information received from reliable sources, Foreign Ministry Andrey Kozyrev has not signed a single document in the past week and a half — which is being viewed in the foreign policy department as a red alert for a public announcement of his resignation. According to the same sources the resignation edict has actually been drawn up and would have been signed and published by today had it not been for the president's illness.

The name of Kozyrev's successor remains a secret, although in Foreign Ministry circles the opinion is that the new appointment will be given to Dmitriy Ryurikov, the president's current foreign policy aide.

**Democrats Call for 7 Nov To Become Day of
Mourning***LD0711183095 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskv
in Russian 1600 GMT 7 Nov 95*

[Passages contained within quotation marks recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] The democratic forces were the last to appear on the streets of the

capital today. According to our correspondent Dmitriy Satarov, who was in the procession, the main aim of the democrats' action was the desire to warn the people of Russia of the possibility of a communist comeback.

[Satarov] The Democratic Union and the Moscow Anti-Fascist Center mounted a picket today at the Solovetsskiy Stone, the monument to the victims of the political repressions on Lubyanka Square.

The picketers' main slogan was to declare the 7th of November a day of national mourning in Russia. Sergey Yushenkov, chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee, backs the idea.

[Yushenkov] "It really is a day of national mourning. October 1917 signalled the start of the annihilation of many millions of our fellow citizens, although the October Coup itself was executed with relatively little bloodshed."

[Satarov] Konstantin Borovoy, the leader of the Party of Economic Freedom, is convinced that much has remained intact, notwithstanding the apologies made by society in recent years.

[Borovoy] "The country is governed today by the very same communists, the very same people, and there has been no repentance. They were saved by an amnesty, so to speak."

[Satarov] Valeriya Novodvorskaya, the chairwoman of the Democratic Union, is convinced that few people want the communists to return to power.

[Novodvorskaya] "The communists will not be able to pass the five-percent hurdle, and anyone who says otherwise is insulting the Russian people, because I cannot conceive of there being more than 300,000 idiots in Russia ready to vote for the communists. Who knows where the communists gathered their signatures? Maybe they gathered them in nuthouses [psikhushki]? They would have got exactly 300,000."

[Satarov] The Interior Ministry puts the attendance at the picket between 70 and 80 people.

[Announcer] According to varying reports, between 20,000 and 70,000 people attended the demonstrations in Moscow today. No serious incidents occurred at the parades, demonstrations, and rallies.

Situation Today Seen Similar to 1917

LD0711221595 Moscow Russian Public Television
First Channel Network in Russian
1800 GMT 7 Nov 95

[Interview with Lieutenant General Rokhlin, former federal troops commander in Chechnya, by unidentified

correspondent; place and date not given; from the "Vremya" newscast — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Correspondent] [video shows Rokhlin in office surrounded by posters for Russia Is Our Home, one of which consists of a large of photograph of Chernomyrdin] Is the situation in 1917 similar to the current state of affairs in Russia and what, in your opinion, is the role of the army in current events, with particular regard to the approaching elections?

[Rokhlin] Now we are once again being asked to participate in a redistribution, although I personally have nothing worth seizing. Well, calls for redistribution could again lead to the same civil war. The situation in 1917 is in a sense similar to that today. It is mainly similar in that a huge abundance of parties and movements are trying to tear apart, to divide up the army. That should not happen in Grozny. The politicians alone should bear responsibility for the army's actions, for its deployment there, and carrying out its mission.

[Correspondent] Is that the only reason why your name is on the electoral lists of Russia Is Our Home?

[Rokhlin] In my opinion, in a difficult period you should not change horses in midstream.

Karasin Welcomes Budget Provisions for Foreign Ministry

MM0711133795 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
(Saturday Edition) in Russian 4 Nov 95 p 3

[Article by Grigoriy Karasin, department director at Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "Elevators at Ministry of Foreign Affairs Will Not Stop Working"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A document appeared recently that is extremely important and necessary to the Russian diplomatic service. This was the government decree "On Questions of Funding and the Material and Technical Situation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MID]." It was perceived at the MID as demonstrating genuine concern for the ministry and containing specific measures to create the necessary conditions to enhance our work's efficiency.

We have regularly said that the many financial, material, and social problems that have accumulated over the past few years are preventing and continue to prevent the ministry from working at full throttle, and have raised these problems with the country's leadership. The adopted decree, which develops a number of provisions of the presidential edict dated 14 March 1995, permits us to resolve the most acute of them. Groundwork is

being done for the full normalization of the situation in the future.

Perhaps the most important thing for us is the task set to the Finance Ministry by the Law "On the 1995 Federal Budget" to finance the MID in full. Now we will finally be able to pay off our debts for running costs and the salaries of the central apparatus's employees. We might hope that the elevators at the MID will not stop working, and the electricity and water will not be cut off.

The other topical issue is that of the retention of young cadres and administrative and technical personnel at the ministry. We are also coming up against it both here in the central apparatus, and abroad. A change is envisaged to the official salary scale at missions abroad to increase salaries of junior diplomatic and administrative and technical personnel.

We can only welcome the fact that the recognition of the particular complexities of the service of our staffers in countries with harsh climatic and public health and epidemiological conditions is at last actually being accompanied by material resources. It is also planned to increase their salaries next year. The level of pay of Russian diplomatic mission staffers will be increased in a number of African and Asian countries as well as in several European countries where it is at present lower than is at all reasonable. The MID's long drawn-out building project is known to many Muscovites — for several years now there has been the gaping hole of an abandoned pit dug for foundations beside its building in Smolenskaya-Sennaya Square, and only this year has work to construct the new building proceeded at a more or less normal pace. This construction project will now be given new impetus, but the 10 billion rubles [R] which are being allotted are clearly insufficient.

Today not a single state institution can work efficiently without up-to-date computer equipment. This is especially true of the MID, all of whose work is based on the collection, processing, and analysis of information. We began to create such a specialized information system for foreign policy issues several years ago, but in the last few years this project has in the main been kept afloat by the selflessness of enthusiasts and modest nonbudget funds. Now the Finance Ministry has been instructed to finance the relevant work in full (having, of course, paid off existing debts in full). We hope that such a specific area as the introduction of advanced types of encoding equipment, which are vitally essential to ensure an uninterrupted operational link with missions abroad, will also receive full funding.

Extremely important to the ministry as a whole, and especially to us staffers at the Information and Press Department, is the adoption of a decision to appropriate

a considerable sum (\$1.4 million) to re-equip our press center. After all, its technical equipment as well as its outward appearance fall far short of what they should be at the press center of a foreign policy department.

There is one other important decision — when next year's federal budget is drawn up, appropriations to ensure the activities of the Russian diplomatic services — MID central apparatus and missions abroad — will be a separate budget item. Such a practice in effect exists in all developed countries, and justifies itself.

Daily Views Prospects of Presidential Contenders

MK0211081195 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Nov 95 p 1-2

[Report by Mikhail Petrachev: "There Are Six Persons in Russia in the 'Presidential Weight Category' Thus Far. June 1996 Is Already Not Too Far Away"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is eight months before the citizens of post-Soviet Russia will for the first time have a chance to elect the highest state leader. The 1996 presidential election in Russia, in the event it is held in due time, will be the first and last one this century. The stormy national history of the 20th century will actually conclude with the holding or the cancellation of the elections. Russia is currently on the verge of important political changes, and it is for the country to decide whether it will head for the democratic way of free elections, for the conservative way of a referendum, or for the authoritarian way of establishing a police state.

Battle Scenario

Already at this point it is quite obvious that the first stage of the election marathon will reveal no absolute winner, so that the country will learn the name of its highest leader only in the second round of the presidential election. Only leaders of four supraparty blocs can actually claim this role: the party of power, radical democrats, communists, and national-patriots.

Thus, the pattern of the presidential election's first round can be portrayed as a political square, with each side representing one supraparty, which can draw approximately 20-30 percent of the vote. No party can reckon on an unqualified victory, and each has one political partner and two irreconcilable foes in the struggle for power. Therefore, the nomination of four candidates amounts to the optimal scenario for the first round of the presidential election. Actual reality, however, will most likely break this abstract scheme, turning the electoral political square into an asymmetrical polygon. It is extremely advantageous for each of the superparties to bank on one leader, and at the same time to see to it that all its adversaries and allies

scatter their forces, nominating as many candidates for president as possible. This will be the pivot of the electoral strategy for all political forces, and the outcome of the first round of the presidential election will depend a great deal on the parties' resistance to an inner split. The party of power has prudently made all of its leaders swear electoral allegiance to the president or his official successor, so both electoral panicking and unauthorized self-nomination are hardly probable here (if Boris Yeltsin's disease does not become prolonged, of course). The communists have also preserved the remnants of former party discipline in their ranks, and there is only one undisputed leader — Gennadiy Zyuganov. Democrats can actually count on Grigoriy Yavlinskiy in the presidential election. However, in the event the party of power opts to undermine the position of its political allies, it will apparently be able to arrange the nomination of alternative democratic candidates for the presidency. Already at this point, the electoral split in the national-patriots' camp can be foreseen, since this movement has not been integrated at the organizational level thus far. It is on this flank that several contenders can join in the canvassing marathon at once. The crucial fight for entering the run-off for the presidency, strange as it may seem, will pit the closest political allies against each other: the party of power and the radical democrats, as well as the communists and national-patriots.

The second round of the presidential election, as distinct from the first one, will not be an individual race for survival, but a purely team fight and a battle for the national idea. In the final race, victory will be gained by the one who manages to form and become the leader of a broad political coalition within, indeed, the few days' span between rounds, and to mobilize in his support the electorates of his allies crushed in the first round. It is possible, though, that the major rivals will display foresight, having formed in advance two powerful political coalitions — that of the "westerners" [zapadniki] and that of the supporters of a powerful statehood [derzhavniki] — to fight the decisive battle in the presidential run-off, whereas the first round will only reveal their leaders.

Aspirants to the Throne

Under the new law "On the Presidential Election in the Russian Federation," a candidate for presidential office can be nominated by an action committee numbering 100 members, but for official registration they must collect the requisite 1 million signatures from their supporters. Thus, the law on the election of the head of state works according to the classic scheme of a broad funnel with a narrow neck, and the official start of the electoral marathon will apparently be marked by

a mighty upsurge in political activity and a hullabaloo by various minor parties and movements. What many will covet is enjoying the limelight of presidential fame, and all that for no more than one protocol and a hundred signatures, though only very powerful political structures will finally manage to enter their leader's name on the ballot.

From January to November 1994, within the framework of the "100 Politicians" project, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA and the "VP" public opinion survey service took monthly polls among 50 directors of the central media, as well as renowned political commentators and political scientists, on the chances of leading Russian politicians running for the presidency. The final distribution of all answers in accordance with the personal structure of the ballot in the forthcoming presidential election looks as follows (the number of experts mentioning this or that politician): V. Zhirinovskiy — 297; G. Yavlinskiy — 239; B. Yeltsin — 229; A. Rutskoy — 204; V. Chernomyrdin — 138; Yu. Luzhkov — 119; Ye. Gaydar — 112; G. Zyuganov — 102; S. Shakhrai — 90; Yu. Skokov — 82; I. Rybkin — 50; V. Shumeyko — 46; S. Baburin — 40; V. Zorkin — 25; A. Tuleyev — 22; A. Lebed — 20; M. Gorbachev — 17; A. Sobchak — 16; K. Borovoy — 15; N. Gonchar — 13; P. Romanov — 12. Throughout the eleven months of 1994, experts cited the names of 53 statesmen. During the period the polls were taken, the presidential "shares" of Zorkin, Shakhrai, and Sobchak fell dramatically, whereas the rating of Lebed and Romanov, on the contrary, went up.

Despite the complicated procedure for the official registration of candidates for the highest state post, certain chiefs of large commercial and financial structures will apparently also manage to overcome this electoral hurdle for publicity reasons, since they have power and money enough to secure 1 million signatures in their own support.

Beginning in January 1995, the experts of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA were reoriented from drafting a ballot for the forthcoming election toward determining its possible winner. They answered the following question: "Which Russian politician currently stands the highest chance of winning the presidential election on the condition that the election is held in the near future?" The distribution of all answers for the nine months of 1995 boils down to the following (the number of experts mentioning this or that politician): V. Chernomyrdin — 253; B. Yeltsin — 196; G. Yavlinskiy — 183; V. Zhirinovskiy — 130; A. Lebed — 128; G. Zyuganov — 118; I. Rybkin — 68; Yu. Luzhkov — 66; A. Rutskoy — 38; Yu. Skokov — 30; V. Shumeyko — 14; B. Gromov — 13; N. Ryzhkov — 11; B. Fedorov —

9; M. Lapshin — 7; Ye. Gaydar — 7. From January to September, 39 names of possible presidents surfaced in the answers of the responders. According to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA experts, six politicians are leading now in the electoral marathon: Chernomyrdin, Yeltsin, Yavlinskiy, Zhirinovskiy, Lebed, and Zyuganov, with no obvious favorite seen among them. In the recent months of the election race, Zhirinovskiy, Luzhkov, and Rutskoy have started lagging behind, while Lebed and Zyuganov are perceptibly gathering momentum.

Now let us stop speculating as to what the results of the new political harvest will be, and simply count the apples that have ripened on the branches of the present power. A real contender for the top state post must be a prominent public figure, have a stable mass electorate of his own, and be supported by potent sociopolitical, parliamentary, or governmental structures. He should provide considerable financial resources for his electoral campaign and have good access to television and the press. As of today, only six politicians "in the presidential weight category" can be singled out in Russia using these criteria.

Boris Yeltsin, as far back as 1993, had all the necessary prerequisites to be reelected to the presidential post. Over the past two years, however — due to the failures of reform, the October [1993] events, the Chechen adventure, and his autocratic manner — he has lost the mass support of voters irretrievably and found himself under heavy propaganda blows from the press. At present, Yeltsin, in fact, has no chance for a new victory in the presidential election, but over the years of his rule he has brilliantly succeeded in achieving the second part of his ultimate goal of retaining power and not letting real contenders for the top state post and for the role of new national leader emerge among the opposition and his entourage. As a result of this staff selection, he has retained complete control over the "party of power" and, against the backdrop of the opposition, is perceived by many successful "new Russians" as the lesser of evils. Therefore, despite a crisis in the people's trust, Yeltsin still remains the leading Russian politician and is capable of exerting enormous influence on the process of his successor's election and, if circumstances turn out to be favorable (or are made such), he could even venture to advance his candidacy.

Viktor Chernomyrdin is now actively building around him an official ruling party and is creating the image of a politician open to the public. The government, acting almost in a "Kashpirovskiy way" [a healer, popularly believed to exert a hypnotic effect on a large audience of television viewers], has already injured people to living in crisis. What as recently as two years ago was perceived as a national disaster is now taken by

many people as a natural rule of life. On the eve of the parliamentary and presidential elections, the survival instinct makes Moscow and regional chiefs unite around Viktor Chernomyrdin and his party of power — "Russia Is Our Home." For a large portion of the present political elite he is an almost ideal candidate for the presidential office. Chernomyrdin is a typical leader of the transitional post-Soviet period. In a few years, he has metamorphosed from a "red director" and former USSR minister into a "new Russian," an industrial baron of one of the world's largest corporations.

True, not long ago in Belarus the head of the government made an attempt to become president but, despite artificially curbing prices and other populist actions, the Belarusian party of power headed by its premier was utterly defeated in the presidential election. Russian voters, too, could act in similar fashion, which still does not rule out the possibility of Chernomyrdin's success.

Yuriy Luzhkov and the Moscow government, unlike "Chernomyrdin's team," indeed have real successes to their credit. Their might is underpinned by Moscow commercial, financial, and construction circles. Luzhkov's ongoing presidential election campaign, in fact, has been interrupted by his backstage conflict with the federal authorities. The most serious obstacle on the Moscow mayor's way to the Kremlin, however, is not the palace intrigues of the party of power, but rather the traditionally negative attitude of the provinces toward Moscow, which is impossible to reverse in the two or three months left before the election. Therefore, having retreated into the "shadows" of administrative activity, Luzhkov is in real danger of being left out of the presidential race.

Grigoriy Yavlinskiy will probably hold his election campaign under the slogan of a democratic alternative to an authoritarian regime. The rapid change in the social system in Russia has given rise to a ruinous conflict between the two fundamental values of modern civil society — the market and democracy. The present political elite can securely protect its interests only by using force. The opposition also needs a rigid authoritarian regime for its plans to restore public order. Therefore, democratically-minded voters, who are against dictatorial "strong-hand" power, will probably vote for Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, and he could find himself in a rather delicate situation in the presidential election — between the devil of the patriotic opposition and the deep blue sea of the present authorities.

Gennadiy Zyuganov's political successes have once again confirmed the existence of a steady trend toward an increase in the role of communist forces in East European and CIS countries. After 10 years of perestroika,

the Brezhnev era remains a model of stability and well-being for most Russians. Against the backdrop of reform failures and nostalgia for a strong state, a conservative wave of mass indignation is lifting the communists to power. Russia has already passed the "point of turning back" to a closed society, and there is absolutely no threat of having a Stalin- or even Brezhnev-type communist regime restored. In the presidential election, in fact, there will be a fierce struggle for power and control over the world's richest state between proponents of a socially- and nationally-oriented capitalism and one of a transnational kind, controlled by apparatchiks and the mafia.

Vladimir Zhirinovskiy took third place in the 1991 election for the top Russian official and won a sensational victory in the 1993 elections to the State Duma. In two years' time, his electorate rose from 6 to 12 million, and the results of the new parliamentary and presidential elections will largely depend on the further evolution of the "Zhirinovskiy phenomenon." At present, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR] no longer has its former monopoly on the nationalistic idea, and it is in for a bitter political struggle with other patriotic parties and movements. Under these conditions, even retaining its position in the State Duma (overcoming the 15-percent barrier) will become for the LDPR and its leader yet another step on their way to the room at the top. More modest results, at the level of 10 percent of the Russian electorate's votes or lower, will signify an end to the active expansion of Zhirinovskiy's party into the sphere of politics.

All of the leading Russian politicians, except Yeltsin, Luzhkov, and Shumeyko, will take part in the December elections to the State Duma. The parliamentary elections will be a dress rehearsal of the final battle for the presidential office between the present informal leaders of the four supraparties: the party of power will be represented by Viktor Chernomyrdin; the democrats, by Grigoriy Yavlinskiy; the communists, by Gennadiy Zyuganov; and the national-patriots, by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. All the main candidates have refrained from entering electoral coalitions so as to be able to assess realistically their personal chances for victory, and only then to think about any unions and blocs. After the parliamentary elections, the "presidents club" could be replenished with a few more politicians.

Until recently, Aleksandr Lebed could not realistically hope to take the top state post because of his being in the military and because of an absence of experience in public political activity. He has already overcome the first obstacle on his way to power by having quit the army. The second one will be assailed in the December elections to the State Duma. If the disgraced general

wins in the parliamentary elections, he will immediately become a prominent political figure, and then a wave of public indignation could well turn him into a national leader.

Aleksandr Rutskey has already gone down in the nation's history as the vice president of Russia. He was a communist and an anticommunist, a democrat and a national-patriot, a reformer and a rebel. To come back to power, Rutskey needs to become the informal leader of the opposition, but such prospects seem rather dim now.

Ivan Rybkin has successfully brought the work of the present parliament to an end. The party of power is presently trying actively to split the opposition using his political potential. If the centrist trends in Russian society increase, Rybkin, as a compromise figure, could well become a real contender for the presidential office.

Nikolay Ryzhkov is also declaring his comeback to big-time politics. The former premier will probably attempt, using his authority, to unite the communists and national-patriots into a single front of opposition forces.

Yuriy Skokov, getting ready for a new ascent to the top, has entered into a very successful alliance with Aleksandr Lebed, and it is yet impossible to predict with absolute precision how the roles of the leader and the one being led will be distributed in this political coupling.

Having read NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's political ratings, any reader will immediately ask: "But who, after all, will be the president of Russia?" An answer to this question, however, should be looked for not at the top level of power, but far beyond it. For this, it is necessary to descend from the Kremlin hill down to the dark and mysterious depth of the mass political consciousness, where in people's minds the political idols of yesterday are already dying and new national leaders are coming into being.

Academician Explains CPRF Draft Anti-Crisis Law
MM3110125795 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 Oct-2 Nov 95 p 4

[Article by State Duma Deputy Doctor of Economic Sciences Igor Bratishchev, academician of the Russian Academy of Humanitarian Sciences: "The Russian Communists' Seven Essentials. CPRF Faction on Ways To Extricate Country From Crisis"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Igor Mikhaylovich Bratishchev is a State Duma deputy, a former RSFSR people's deputy, a doctor of economic sciences, and a professor

and also has higher legal training. He is well known as the creator and first chairman of the "Communists of Russia" deputies' faction (First Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies, May 1990). He is leader of the group preparing the text of the "Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Russian Soviet Federation," essentially the only alternative to the present version. He is a high-class professional. He is currently also a State Duma candidate deputy for the no. 142 single-seat electoral district (Rostov Oblast).

Nowadays an ever increasing number of Russian inhabitants are beginning to understand the conceptual and practical futility of the official doctrine aimed at rendering all aspects of society's economic activity capitalist. The alienation of nine-tenths of the population from ownership has led to the inevitable alienation of the authorities from the people with the result that the country is on the verge of national catastrophe according to all the indicators of economic security.

More than 50 Russian regions require special needs status, and a great many territories in the federation have been declared economic disaster zones (spheres).

By mid-1995 GDP had declined by over 50 percent compared with 1990. The economy continues to suffer from deindustrialization and degradation, and work stoppages at enterprises and even major structural production units are continuing on a massive scale. Such vitally important sectors as agricultural and road construction machine building, the electrical engineering industry, instrument-making, pipe-making, production of plastics and chemical fibers, and so forth have also dropped out of the system of social reproduction. Similar processes are taking place in agriculture, too.

The further deepening of the slump and the economic squeeze are being accompanied by the following factors: a) a deep investment crisis (the volume of capital investments in Russia is a little over 25 percent of the 1990 level); b) the preservation of the narrow raw-materials orientation of exports; c) the wholesale decline in labor productivity (down almost 40 percent in the past two years); d) the decline in the value and significance of productive labor, that is, labor "materialized into objects"; e) the lack of state monitoring of the origin and movement of capital and other sources; f) the criminalization of the economy (around 40,000 enterprises in Russia already belong to criminal groupings); g) the stratification of society by income level (according to various estimates the population's real incomes have fallen by a factor of two to three and for some categories — rural workers, scientific staffers, and pensioners — by a factor of six to seven).

As a result of the "reforms" in society a potentially conflictual social structure has been created in which there is total antagonism. The authoritarian-comprador character of the radical reformers' mentality has really made itself plain.

The latest government program "The Reforms and the Development of the Russian Economy in 1995-1997" contains little new when compared with the official documents of recent years. In fact this program is just another in the long line of sets of irresponsible and totally unfounded promises.

The socio-economic situation in the country is continuing to deteriorate and the threat of economic collapse is growing. The disastrous nature of the current course is becoming increasingly obvious to everyone except the powers that be. It no longer matters whether this is due to the ignorance of the authors and supporters of the "reform" or the selfish aims of the social strata whose interests they represent. What matters is the need to find sufficiently effective and reliable solutions to the prevailing situation which meet the interests of the majority of our citizens.

It was precisely that need which led to the appearance of the federal draft law "On Emergency Measures to Overcome the Socioeconomic Crisis and Avert National Catastrophe." The draft law's extremely necessary and indeed emergency measures are of a systematic, clearly conditional, and interconnected character. Over 20 legislative acts are organically interwoven into its fabric (framework). Here are just a few of them: "On Financial-Industrial Groups," "On the Expansion of the Rights of Labor Collectives and the Regulation of Production-Economic Activity and the Distribution of Enterprises' Incomes," "On Social and Economic Disaster Zones (Spheres)," "On the Fundamentals of Agrarian Policy and the System of State Support for Agriculture," "On the Program of Anti-Inflation Measures and the Stabilization of the Budget," "On Changes to the Taxation System," "On Banks and Banking," "On Credit and Financial Regulation," "On Improving the Structure of the Organs of State Management of the Economy," "On the Struggle against Economic Crime and Corruption," "On the System of the State Plan Regulation of the Economy in Market Conditions," "On the Self-Management of the People's [narodnyy] Enterprise," "On Nationalization in the Russian Federation," and "On Guarantees of the Elimination of Labor Remuneration Discrimination against Budget-Funded Workers"....

The draft law presumes the regulation of five groups of legal relations and consequently five subsections have been included in its structure.

Section One (articles 1-3) is dedicated to the democratization of ownership relations, that is the democratization or socialization of these relations, not their individualization.

The creation of self-managed people's enterprises and the expansion of labor collectives' rights at enterprises in various forms of ownership play an important role in democratizing property relations too. This direction:

- corresponds most to our society's collectivist mentality and traditions;
- is the necessary condition for countering the bureaucratization and criminalization of property and management relations;
- increases the "survivability" of enterprises, creates the conditions for preventing mass bankruptcies, and helps to form a competitive market environment;
- ensures the fair distribution of enterprises' incomes and curbs the growth of economic and social inequality;
- creates the economic basis for genuine sovereignty of the people and democracy;
- and guarantees national control over enterprises.

Article 2 of the draft law points out that owners of enterprises which have been or are being privatized are members of the labor collective with the right to vote while the remaining shareholders are co-owners of enterprises without the right to vote but with the right to receive dividends. Enterprise workers and their equivalent have the right to form a single bloc of shares and assign it to the official management of the labor collective's representative organ.

Section two of the draft law contains norms which are aimed at the stabilization and restoration of production (articles 4-8).

We believe that in the prevailing situation a two- or three-year legally-approved State Program (plan) for the restoration of the Russian economy is needed.

In this particular section the draft law includes measures to support the country's industry and agro-industrial complex, norms aimed at the corporatization of production, emergency measures which should be undertaken in the economic and social disaster zones (spheres), and finally norms regulating the restoration of the economic ties with CIS countries which have broken down.

It intends to make the importing of foreign capital and technologies as well as the state regulation of sectors and forms of foreign investments subordinate to the development needs of Russian industry.

It has to be said that foreign capital is the government team's main "sacred cow" and an object of almost mystical veneration on which the "reformers'" entire hopes

are pinned. The government is ready to grant foreign capital complete freedom of action in Russia and every concession (including those which discriminate against their own enterprises) in an attempt to outdo other countries in the competition for foreign investments.

It is no coincidence that the 500 largest privatized Russian enterprises with a real value of at least \$200 billion were actually sold for \$7.2 billion, in other words, for peanuts, and to a considerable extent are now under the control of foreign firms and structures which serve as a front for them. Undoubtedly all this is being done deliberately so as to undermine our country's national security and defense capability and to back up the West's strategy of "Russia's guaranteed technological backwardness."

Section three of the draft law (articles 9-11) is dedicated to measures to prevent the further lowering of Russians' living standard, restore social guarantees, and protect the country's intellectual and spiritual potential.

This section also highlights such concepts as the "social minimum," "social guarantees," "the economic mechanism for the formation of a social sphere accessible to all," and so forth.

For the period of economic stabilization it is proposed to establish in law a different subsistence minimum for each component of the federation based on a socially validated minimum consumer budget and elaborated in conjunction with the trade unions. The minimum wage and pension are to be brought into line with the subsistence minimum and all forms of grants and allowances are to be pegged to the minimum and average wage and wage rises.

The draft law envisages:

- the introduction of the guaranteed provision of prime necessities at affordable prices to children, mothers of new born babies, invalids, and poor pensioners.
- the settlement of the state and enterprise wage debt, the guarantee of the prompt payment of wages, and the introduction of the legal liability of the state, enterprises, and specific individuals for delays in wage payment which take into account psychological harm and losses due to inflation;
- the regulation in law of employment according to specialism for young people who graduate from state and municipal educational institutions of all types;
- and the elaboration of the legal provisions of full employment for the able-bodied population, the organizational-legal backup for this task, and so forth.

Section four (articles 12-16) contains five articles which make it possible to achieve the real rather than merely

apparent defeat of hyperinflation and the normalization of the situation in the country's credit and finance sphere.

The draft law proposes the introduction into parallel circulation of a hard internal convertible ruble with a certain gold content (standard) and the formation of a large-scale investment fund for the modernization and restructuring of the economy based on the initial revenue from the issue of hard rubles.

For the active mobilization of monetary resources to revive the base sectors of industry and agriculture the draft law proposes:

- to create a system of state banks and investment funds and in, particular to create a State Commercial Bank for the modernization and restructuring of the economy (with regional branches);
- to empower the Central Bank of Russia to establish bank interest rate ceilings for investment and commercial credits at the level adopted in world practice (taking account of inflation in old and new hard rubles);
- to channel a certain number of commercial bank deposits into the State Investment Fund pledged against state securities backed up by hard currency rubles;
- and to elaborate a balanced system of taxes to stimulate the development of production, to extricate the economic disaster zones (spheres) from crisis, and so forth.

Finally, section five of the draft law (articles 17-19) contains norms aimed at improving the state regulation of the economy.

The key element in a number of these norms is the creation of a Russian State Planning Committee based on the Economics Ministry. Its functions could include the preparation of plans and programs to extricate Russia from the crisis, to develop and restructure the economy, the coordination of the activity of ministries and departments, to ensure the management of the investment process in the state sector of the economy, and so forth. At the same time there are measures to regulate the state apparatus.

Such in its briefest form is the content of the draft law "On Emergency Measures to Overcome the Socioeconomic Crisis and Avert National Catastrophe."

I have to say that our draft law as reworked and clarified is included in the State Duma's fall agenda and in all likelihood will be examined in November.

Thus before talking about global problems, ultimate goals, and so forth, it is necessary to put our economic house in order. We have had enough of inept and idiotic

experiments based on the principle: "Saturday is not made for man, man is made for Saturday."

The main thing that we need now is to instill in people's minds an understanding of the simple truth that the country's fate will be decided by the recovery (or nonrecovery) of production.

That is the basis that we, the authors of the draft law, proceed from. We believe that there are at least seven "essentials" necessary to overcome the crisis and avert national catastrophe. What are they?

- it is necessary to restore the national economy's shattered investment sector;
- it is necessary to restore the supply and sales links between enterprises;
- there must be an efficient and clear mechanism for the taxation of incomes and capital (it must not be fiscal but must stimulate production);
- it is necessary to regulate prices by means of legislative, financial-credit, and other methods;
- it is necessary to strengthen the ruble and securely protect the national currency against all outside monetary interventions;
- it is necessary to pursue a rational state policy to protect the domestic market and ensure the strict monitoring of private export activity;
- finally, it is necessary to get away from the principle of "more of the market, less of the state."

If we resolve these seven "essential" tasks we will develop production. If we develop production we will implement the slogan "Labor — the sovereignty of the people — socialism — Russia!"

Military & Space Issues

Government Bans Power Cut-Off to Defense Enterprises

LD0811101095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0916 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, November 8 (ITAR-TASS) — The Russian government has adopted a resolution, banning cut-off of power, gas, heat and other fuel resources to the most important facilities of the country.

Recent "emergencies" when energy enterprises cut off power supply to defence facilities of the country because of overdue debts for electricity supplies should not happen again.

A list of enterprises not subject to the "blackout" came to ITAR-TASS today. It includes facilities of the Russian Defence Ministry, the Interior Ministry, secret services,

border guard services, military units belonging to the Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations and vitally important facilities, such as electric power stations, gas and central heating networks, water supply stations, sewage and other facilities.

The resolution will remain in effect until May 15, 1996.

Russians Claim Development of Ebola Vaccine, Antiserum

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[FBIS Media Note] Russian media reports indicate that Russian scientists have developed an antiserum against the virus which causes Ebola fever, a highly lethal hemorrhagic disease not indigenous to Russia, and are also working on a vaccine. "Military physicians" (Russian Public Television First Channel Network 18 Oct 95) at the Virology Center of the Russian Defense Ministry's Microbiology Institute (KOM-SOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 24 Oct 95) have announced the development of an antiserum to Ebola which "makes it possible to cure up to 100 percent of patients." The antiserum is derived from horses' blood (KOM-SOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 24 Oct 95, VOPROSY VIRUSOLOGII May-June 95). The scientists credited with the breakthrough are: Doctor of Medical Sciences Colonel Viktor Mikhaylov, Candidates of Medical Sciences Igor Boriseyevich, V. Krasnyanskiy and V. Gradoboyev and Candidates of Biological Sciences N. Potryvayev, Ye. Lebedinskiy, N. Chernikova and G. Timenkova. The center is subordinate to the Radiation, Chemical and Biological Protection Troops, headed by Igor Tikhonov (KOM-SOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 24 Oct 95).

According to KOM-SOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, the military researchers began to work on obtaining a gamma globulin against Ebola in 1993. Although "not inclined to study remote African diseases," the researchers began this research because of "an outbreak of a disease very similar to Ebola — the Hantaan virus — near an American military base." Several months ago, they obtained an effective hyperimmune serum and gave the World Health Organization 100 doses for use in the 1995 Ebola outbreak in Zaire, where it "gave excellent results."

OGONEK (No 23 Jun 95) reported that scientists at the Vektor Government Science Center's Institute of Molecular Biology have been working on a recombinant Ebola vaccine for several years and plan to test several versions of it if they receive funding. Although Vektor is now "an exclusively civilian institution under the Ministry of Health" (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA 15 Jun 95), according to Professor Sergey Victorovich Netesov, it began Ebola research "several years ago for

defense purposes" and has been publishing its research results since 1992, when it was first allowed to do so (OGONEK No 23 Jun 95). Vektor has received no government support for its Ebola work since 1992 and this year obtained only a quarter of necessary operating funds. The center is reportedly experiencing severe financial difficulty and has practically stopped research work (OGONEK No 23 Jun 95, also see companion article).

In May 1995, in apparent contradiction to these reports, Prof. Yevgeniy Tkachenko commented that the Belarusian Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology in Minsk was the only institution on CIS territory to be conducting Ebola research (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 20 May 95). Tkachenko is a department head at the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences' M. P. Chumakov Institute of Poliomyelitis and Viral Encephalitis (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 20 May 95), and his comment may indicate unwillingness to comment on the research programs in the general press, even though they have been reported in the scientific literature.

Commercial Prospects for Satellite Photography Viewed

MM081111895 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 4 Nov 95 p 7

[Article by Mikhail Rebrov under the "On the Space Structures Market" rubric: "Spy Satellite Acquires Legal Status and Promises To Be a Useful Tool for the Effective Solution of Many Purely Peaceful Problems"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] To begin with, three short, but highly important digressions.

First. When the Iron Curtain collapsed, Russia sold to the Americans shots of the Pentagon and the White House taken by spy satellite. The U.S. leadership, which had guessed at the existence of such pictures, was far less surprised than the technical specialists, who had not suspected that the Russians were capable of making such excellent cameras. Incidentally, they are still among the best in the world.

Second. According to UN data, until the last quarter of our century, only 13 percent of the territory of the continents had been photographed on a scale of 1:25,000 or larger. And people possessed maps on a scale of 1:100,000 of just over 40 percent of the world's land surface. There are sizable territories for which there are no maps at all.

Third. The number of pictures that can be taken from an orbiting station in five minutes would require two years if taken from an aircraft, and 80 years if taken by geological expeditions to the spot. [passage omitted]

Satellite photography, which formerly was exclusively under the jurisdiction of the military department, can now be used for civilian purposes. A government decision on this question was adopted back in 1992. But.... Once again this confounded "but": Whereas the United States and France push their work energetically and have a network of dealers in many countries, we have yet to get off the ground in this area.

At a recent meeting with representatives of the Russian Space Agency, the Ministry of Defense, and the Conversion Technologies Center, Georgiy Savin, the leader of this center, explained that henceforth this state organization would handle the problems of disseminating space information on a contractual basis. The Conversion Technologies Center was set up on the basis of the Precision Instruments Scientific Research Institute and attracted specialists from the "Priroda" state center, the "Planeta," "Kosmokarty," and "Sovinformsputnik" Science and Production Associations, and Ministry of Defense scientific research institutes.

The idea of bringing all these specialists under one roof deserves every support. Presumably, the secret sale of satellite photographs to foreign brokers at knockdown prices will now be ended, a reliable barrier will be placed in the way of the leaking of strictly official information containing classified information of a state and military character, and, at the same time, bureaucratic obstacles on the road to the international market will be smashed.

And so, we seriously intend to make a start. It is about time. It is said that Russians take a long time to harness their horses, but are swift riders. Let us hope that the Conversion Technologies Center manages to pick up speed without further time-wasting (I repeat: The decision was adopted three years ago). It is baffling that the search for potential buyers has so far been limited to Latin America. A popular product should be offered everywhere. We should not chase after illusory profits, but realistically assess the opportunities that are here today. Then the prospects for tomorrow will be more reliable.

And one last point. It is not only military satellites that are capable of achieving all the aforementioned tasks. Work on satellite pictures is being carried out on board "Resurs-F," and during November and December two KFA-1000 cameras will take pictures from the "Mir" orbiting complex. However, let us not be too hasty. Let us wait and see.

Federal Assembly

Yeltsin Rejects Bill on Duma Criminal Code Amendments

LD0611150595 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1454 GMT 6 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Nov 6 (INTERFAX) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin again returned the federal bill on amendments to the Code of Criminal Proceedings to the State Duma. The amendments relate to the courts' right to influence police custody decisions.

In a letter to Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin, transmitted to INTERFAX by the presidential press service, Yeltsin refuses to sign the bill which was rejected by the Federation Council Saturday.

On October 27 the State Duma made a decision on taking its dispute with the Federation Council to the Constitutional Court.

It is only after a conclusion by the Constitutional Court that he can consider the amended bill on criminal proceedings, Yeltsin said.

Duma Passes Law on Financial-Industrial Groups

MM0711165195 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
(Saturday Edition) in Russian 4 Nov 95 p 5

[Report by Valentina Vedesova: "Status of Financial-Industrial Groups Defined"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At their latest session, State Duma deputies overcame their chronic indiscipline and confrontational approach and, displaying a sense of responsibility, unanimously voted in favor of adopting a law which they were examining again in its second reading. The Federal Law "On Financial-Industrial Groups" was not passed at the previous session, in spite of the fact that not a single vote was cast against it and the prescribed quorum of deputies were present. There were insufficient votes in favor of it because 40 deputies, members of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR] faction, abstained: Zhirinovskiy, with characteristic self-confidence, stated that he would refuse to support a law encouraging the formation of joint ventures which are capable of "pulling Russia apart." Here, Vladimir Volfovich forgot that during the first reading of this document, he had expressed a favorable opinion of it. Moreover, he had forgotten that the law's drafters include Vladimir Gusev, a member of the LDPR faction and chairman of the Russian Federation State Duma Committee for Industry, Construction, Transportation, and Power Generation. Gusev was absent from the session and did not manage to tell Zhirinovskiy in time what was what. But his oversight was put right a day later.

The law was given at once both its second and third readings.

Why are financial-industrial groups necessary? In order to attract the investment needed to retool decrepit plants, modernize equipment, utilize new technologies, and start up the production of output meeting world standards.

Some 15 financial-industrial groups have been officially registered. In actual fact, many more are in operation. But decisions on another 150 applications are awaited from the State Committee for Industrial Policy. The legalization of banks' and plants' corporate statuses is necessary in order for them to receive various concessions. For financial-industrial groups to flourish, particular conditions are necessary, which permit them to overcome such obstacles as the antimonopolies law and the multi-layered system of taxation. The adopted "Law on Financial-Industrial Groups" will finally take care of this. It envisages the "recognition of financial-industrial groups as sanctioned monopolies...", and the granting of state guarantees, credits, and financial support.

Nevertheless, the law's adoption does not signal the end of all problems associated with the formation and development of financial-industrial groups, experts from the Russian Federation Presidential Staff Analytical Administration consider. It cannot determine the financial-industrial groups' organizational and legal status. What is also needed is a law on amendments to the Russian Federation Civil Code, which will confirm that the financial-industrial groups are long-term associations of enterprises.

Changes in Duma Deputies' Party Affiliation Viewed

MM0711125595 Moscow TRUD in Russian 4 Nov 95 p 4

[Article by Nikolay Dorofeyev: "Deputies' Migration Routes Are Incomprehensible"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Nothing in the world stands still. Everything in and around us is in constant motion. Russian deputies are not advocates of static forms either in this respect. The wind of change is making them do what the official literature of the State Duma committee to organize the Duma's work modestly calls: "Movement of deputies in deputies' associations."

Information of this kind, thank God, has never been a state secret at any time in the State Duma's existence. There is a document dated 15 January 1994 in TRUD archives, containing lists of deputies' associations which had just entered the parliamentary scene. Compare it

with a similar document from 11 October 1995 and you get a very surprising result.

The main thing is the losses suffered by the deputies' associations. Practically no one has avoided them. No, voters should not fear for our deputies. Despite the intense and sometimes outrageous nature of parliamentary debates, the vast majority of them are alive and well. But they are moving or, to use the scientific term, migrating among the various deputies' factions in the Duma.

During the period under review the number of supporters of the Agrarian Party of Russia has dwindled in parliament. There used to be 57, now there are 50. The number of ladies in the "Women of Russia" movement faction has fallen from 23 to 20. The PRES [Party of Russian Unity and Accord] party faction appears to contain fewer and fewer supporters of Russian unity and accord. Only 13 (fateful number?) people remain out of the 30 who entered the Duma beneath Sergey Shakhrai's banners.

The number of supporters of the new regional policy in the Duma has nearly halved (65 to 35). No wonder, really: There is no regional policy in Russia at the moment, either an old one or a new one.

But the ones who have really suffered in the course of the parliament's difficult life are the factions of parties and movements that call themselves democratic or have that word in their name. Once the biggest faction in the State Duma, "Russia's Choice" struggles to make 27 deputies. The Democratic Party faction, which was small anyway, lost one-fifth of its supporters straight away. There are only 11 left. Even the faction of the world's most liberal democrats, Zhirinovskiy's, has diminished: There were 63, there remain 55....

Fine, you still have the group of revolutionaries, but perhaps they are just as remote from the people as before. But there are now more of those who are either "close to the people" or speak for the people. The CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] faction has increased by two firm Leninists. Not a lot, but perhaps they are the first swallows of spring?

Basically, deputies are moving either to bring their political views into line with current trends or, on the other hand, harsh Russian reality is forcing disenchanted parliamentarians to abandon their former ideals. Deputies' migration routes lead mainly to groups with the promising names "Russia" and "Stability".

Has the State Duma become better or worse and is there some benefit as a result of this Brownian movement at the taxpayer's expense? The voters will answer this 17 December.

But we all once learned and still remember one of the rules of arithmetic: Changing the position of the elements to be added together does not change the total.

Regional Affairs

Chechnya Reportage; Negotiations, Meetings in Groznyy

Zavgayev on Special Status For Chechnya

*LD0711154095 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1414 GMT 7 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Nov 6 (INTERFAX) — Half of Chechen cabinet members are supporters of Dzhokhar Dudayev, the leader of Chechnya Doku Zavgayev told the press in Groznyy Monday. In this respect the present government is a coalition, he said. "If need be, the number of cabinet members will be increased," Zavgayev said.

He reaffirmed his readiness to conduct a dialogue with anyone, including Dudayev, if that benefits the Chechen people.

Zavgayev said he visited the Terek part of the republic where he met militants. "Those with whom I talked are normal people many of whom picked up arms under varying circumstances, but there is nothing against them except the possession of arms," he said.

According to him, militants wished to surrender arms and return to their families and peaceful life. "The only thing they ask for is reliable guarantees of non-persecution by the authorities. I gave a positive reply," the Chechen leader said.

In Zavgayev's opinion the time that will be required to restore the economy and social sphere in Chechnya depends on the assistance of Moscow and neighboring territories of Russia. "We count on aid from Moscow and we do get it," he said.

Zavgayev thinks Chechnya should have a special status, but it "should build its autonomy in the framework of the federal constitution and Russian law."

"We are working on an agreement on the key principles of relations with the Russian Federation and after free democratic elections to local government bodies we will sign a treaty the way Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and other republics have done," he said.

Zavgayev thinks that a referendum on the status of Chechnya should not be rushed. "Civic accord must be reached, conditions created for the return of all refugees, normal life restored, elections held, and only after that if there is any need for it, organize a referendum," he added.

Khasbulatov, Zavgayev Meet in Groznyy

*LD0711205695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
2023 GMT 7 Nov 95*

[By Nikolay Zagnoyko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNY, November 7 (ITAR-TASS) — The former speaker of the Russian parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov, today met Doku Zavgayev, the new prime minister of Chechnya.

Khasbulatov, now the leader of the Union for Revival of the Chechen Republic, told ITAR-TASS before leaving Groznyy for Moscow today that he had discussed with Zavgayev the political situation in Chechnya.

He said his public meetings in Groznyy and other areas of Chechnya had assured him that Chechnya's population accepts the idea of local self-rule elections.

Khasbulatov said the elections would be a stabilising factor, and their postponement would mean keeping the explosive situation in place.

The elections might be held in March of 1996, Khasbulatov said.

Further on Khasbulatov, Zavgayev Meeting

*LD0711211795 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 2000 GMT 7 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Ruslan Khasbulatov believes that to settle the Chechen crisis, it is necessary to go back to its primordial causes, that is, to the uncertain nature of relations between the Russian Federation and Chechnya. He stated this to INTERFAX in Groznyy today. He noted that he discussed this and other issues at his meeting with Doku Zavgayev, the new leader of Chechnya, today.

According to the ex-speaker of the Russian parliament, for the conflicting sides to come to an agreement on the status of the Chechen Republic, it is necessary to conclude a temporary agreement on the main principles of a treaty between Russia and Chechnya. Khasbulatov believes that common citizenship, a common monetary system, free borders, and the demilitarization of the republic should become the main elements of this document.

Khasbulatov on Resumption of Talks

*LD081112195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1057 GMT 8 Nov 95*

[By Tamara Zamyatina]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, November 8 (ITAR-TASS) — Ruslan Khasbulatov, who returned

from Grozny on Tuesday, suggests "the immediate resumption of talks with the participation of representatives of the leader of the Chechen Republic Doku Zavgayev, supporters of Dzhokhar Dudayev and federal authorities for purposes of working out a treaty on the status of the Chechen Republic."

He said today in a TASS interview that his opinion is shared by Olivier Pelen, head of the OSCE mission in Grozny, and Dudayev's supporters. "There is every reason to resume the negotiating process in Moscow, and I am sure Dudayev's representatives will accept the invitation," said Khasbulatov, who had meetings in Grozny with Khozh-Akhmed Yarikhonov, head of the Chechen delegation at the talks, and Aslan Maskhadov, chief of staff of Dudayev's armed units.

Speaking about the stand assumed by the leader of the Chechen Republic, Khasbulatov pointed out that "he is very much inclined to heed instructions from Moscow and assesses the situation in Chechnya in a wrong way, which may lead to the resumption of the war."

Responding to the question why he came to this conclusion, Khasbulatov said: "Doku Zavgayev holds out rather weakly against the pressure from Moscow, whose purpose is to remove Dudayev's supporters from the negotiating process on a peaceful settlement of the situation and discontinue talks." He believes the federal authorities are wrong, when they maintain that the lawful power bodies have been restored in Chechnya, and Dudayev's supporters should not take part in the talks any longer. "All this may lead to the heightening of tension and the disruption of the talks," Khasbulatov said.

According to Khasbulatov, before Zavgayev was appointed chairman of the government of national revival of Chechnya, they jointly worked out a policy, aimed at the immediate resumption of talks. "But Doku Zavgayev is departing from this stand," Khasbulatov stated after his meetings with the new Chechen leader in Grozny. He rejected the supposition that he might be jealous of Zavgayev's status. "I went to Zavgayev's residence right from the airport. According to the mentality of highlanders, this means that I recognized him as a new head of the government. Besides, I do not claim any post in the Chechen Republic and said as much to Zavgayev," he stressed.

Khasbulatov said that, in his opinion, his task is to act as a mediator between Dudayev's supporters, the Zavgayev government and the federal authorities "in order to resume talks as the only way to settle the crisis in Chechnya."

Khasbulatov Refuses To Work Under Zavgayev

LD0711173395 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1631 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNY, Nov 7 (INTERFAX) — The leader of the Chechen People's Union for the Revival of the Republic Ruslan Khasbulatov refuses to serve as a Cabinet Minister under Doku Zavgayev.

Khasbulatov has nothing against Zavgayev but he is displeased that a number of those who served as Ministers and Deputy Ministers under Salambek Khadzhiyev have retained their positions.

In Khasbulatov's view, Zavgayev "faces problems." Khadzhiyev's appointees will not let him "take a look around and get down to business."

Zavgayev is working under difficult conditions, Khasbulatov said.

'50,000' Attend St. Petersburg Oct Revolution Rally

LD0711132495 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1119 GMT 7 Nov 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Natalya Cherepanova]

[FBIS Translated Text] St. Petersburg, 7 Nov (ITAR-TASS) — The city's communists marked the 78th anniversary of the October Revolution by a crowded rally on Dvortsovaya Palace Square. According to witnesses, the rally was attended by about 50,000 people, representing four communist parties — the All-Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the Russian Communist Workers' Party, and the Russian Party of Communists — and such movements as Working Leningrad, the Union of Soviet Women, and Officers' Union.

Viktor Tyulkin, the leader of the Russian Communist Workers' Party, appealed to the rally to take part in the forthcoming Duma elections "despite the fact that the working people cannot come to power by parliamentary means. Everything will depend on the balance of power outside parliament," he said.

Leaflets and books of the "Communists — Working Russia — For the Soviet Union" election bloc and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation were circulated at the rally.

Primoriye Rally Demands Yeltsin, Cabinet Resignations

LD0811130395 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1032 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] VLADIVOSTOK, Nov 8 (INTERFAX-EURASIA) — A rally in the Far Eastern

city of Bolshoy Kamen demanded the immediate resignation of Russian President Yeltsin, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and the federal Cabinet as a whole.

The rally brought together 3,000 to 5,000 men and women on November 8. It demanded the payment of wages which have been delayed for about six months to many residents, including staff workers at the city's biggest defense plant Zvezda.

The rally also demanded more attention to citizens' needs in moves to switch off electricity and turn off heat in housing projects.

Bolshoy Kamen is living under extreme conditions now that electricity is switched off for five to ten hours a day and housing projects remain practically unheated.

Primoriye Governor Yevgeniy Nazdratenko arrived in Bolshoy Kamen to attend and support the rally. He promised to convey the people's demands to President Yeltsin and the federal government, and the rally decided to raise money to send representatives of the protesting labor force of the Primoriye Territory to Moscow.

Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast Plans Own Gold Reserve

MM0711141395 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Nov 95 p 1

[Report from "From our Correspondents and News Agencies" column: "Nizhniy Novgorod Creating Its Own Gold Reserve"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast administration is planning to create a regional gold reserve that could serve as a guarantee for obtaining foreign investments, INTERFAX-EURASIA reports. In 1994 on the basis of a decree by Governor Boris Nemtsov and permission from the Russian Federation Committee for Precious Stones and Precious Metals, a state "Dragmet" enterprise was created in the oblast for the initial processing of precious metal scrap and waste and is already producing 24-carat gold.

To create a gold reserve the administration must receive permission from the Russian Federation Government to keep in the oblast not 4 percent but 20-30 percent of the gold obtained during production at "Dragmet." It is planned that the gold reserve will be kept at the Central Bank main administration for Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast.

Economic Issues

Yeltsin's Edict on 'Rostselmash' Viewed

MM0811115995 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Nov 95 p 2

[Report by Yuriy Beshpalov: "Instead of 750 Billion Rubles 'Rostselmash' Has Received Oversight Council from President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Rostov-na-Donu — The finally signed presidential edict "on measures to supply agricultural producers with grain and feed harvesting equipment and state support for the structural restructuring of the 'Rostselmash' joint-stock company" has, contrary to expectations, proved quite tough. At any rate it does not promise the enormous monopolist plant a cloudless life.

Yet initially, after "Rostselmash" General Director Yuriy Peskov was able to get a meeting with President Yeltsin in Sochi it seemed that the desired 750 billion rubles [R] were about to pour down in a golden rainfall onto the empty shops of the plant, which had been stopped for a month. But, while sharing Peskov's concern at the state of affairs in the production of agricultural equipment, the president preferred not to make the decision which the combine lobby was trying to impose on him but to send his aide Aleksandr Livshits to Rostov. It was largely thanks to this visit that the text of the edict signed by Yeltsin, in the opinion of local analysts, has proved the toughest of all options examined this year.

It is not even that instead of the R750 billion in investment credits on which the "Rostselmash" leadership had very much been counting the edict provides for the allocation of just R128.5 billion and that through the Agrosnab [exact expansion unknown] for the hire purchase of combines. The most important thing is that the edict provides for the creation of an oversight council at "Rostselmash," which will inevitably restrict Yuriy Peskov's formerly absolute power at the enterprise. The oversight council, which has been joined by presidential specialists, representatives of the Rostov Oblast Administration, and shareholders of "Rostselmash" itself, has received temporary control of 20 percent of the enterprise's shares belonging to the state. (Incidentally, formerly there was a vigorous discussion of the option of selling the state block of shares but now this idea has obviously had to be abandoned — the search for outside investors has been unsuccessful). In addition henceforth no reshuffles of leading cadres are possible without agreement with the oversight council. The edict also provides for a specific mechanism for the return of the budget funds received by "Rostselmash" — without this the allocation of the next "injections" will be

impossible. And, finally, the presidential edict does not contain a clause on the allocation of tax benefits to the plant.

While refraining from direct comment, Director Peskov's comrades in arms nonetheless hint transparently that several Moscow leaders have an abiding desire to wipe "Rostselmash" from the face of the earth. I do not think that the president's advisers were marked by such bloodthirstiness. Especially as it is clear not only to economists but also to any normal person that "Rostselmash's" monopoly position in the production of agricultural equipment cannot continue forever.

The Russian countryside has changed too much in recent years and will obviously change even more in the future. And the scheme included in the "Rostselmash" strategy is increasingly markedly entering into contradiction with real life. The enormous and expensive "Don" combines either do not enjoy popularity or the rural inhabitants do not have the money for them. At any rate it is obvious that the demand for the Rostov combines can be supported only by "by the rod" or with the aid of state subsidies. The present "Rostselmash" would seem to have no call to develop the production of different, competitive models: Its competitors are not only not treading on its heels, they cannot even be seen.

What will happen to "Rostselmash" after the presidential edict? No one now ventures to say with certainty. The possibility is not ruled out that the enterprise will be broken up into several independent plants and firms bringing in outside purchasers and investors. But it is also entirely feasible that the giant will hold out but thanks to structural (and, of course, personnel) restructuring will change its strategy and face reality. In either case one can sense the approach of big upheavals at one of Russia's oldest plants. The collective of many thousands is awaiting them with understandable anxiety.

But can it be worse than now? The plant shops are still empty although the enforced one month's leave ended 1 November.

Economists Criticize Artificial Dollar/Ruble Rate

MM0711133395 Moscow TRUD in Russian 4 Nov 95
p 1

[Unattributed feature citing economists P. Bunich, S. Assekritov, and D. Lvov: "The Dollar Appears to Have Been Tamed, But Prices are Still Running Wild"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Not so long ago we were linking rising prices of consumer goods to the behavior of the dollar: When it rose, prices rose. But the government has installed the foreign currency in a special band, so the rise in the dollar rate has slowed, and it

even declined markedly between May and July. But prices are continuing to soar with admirable persistence. This is graphically demonstrated by the Russian State Committee for Statistics diagram we publish below [paper publishes a graph showing consumer prices rising by 213 percent and the dollar rate rising by 128 percent as at end October 1995 compared with end December 1994].

We asked some well-known economists to comment on the situation. Here are their views.

P. Bunich, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, first pro-vice-chancellor of the Academy of the National Economy and State Duma deputy:

"It is entirely natural that consumer prices should rise. Production is at a standstill, few goods are being produced, so they are bound to be expensive. Try as the government might to improve the situation, the prices bandwagon has its own momentum.

"I think the dollar should also behave naturally — as in the world market in general. Here it has been tamed. The Finance Ministry is putting large amounts of securities into circulation and using them to 'magnetize' rubles. And this is helping to 'kill' the dollar on our market.

"The policy of the Central Bank is doing even more to bring down the dollar rate. From time to time it dumps on the market dollars from its own reserves.

"I think the current trends will remain in place until the presidential elections. Prices will rise, and if inflation is seven percent [per month] this year, it cannot be any lower than five percent per month at best next year. But the budget is based on a figure of 1.9 percent — mainly of course for political reasons and also so that the West provides credits.

"All this is causing the country considerable economic damage. We are stifling exporters with the low dollar rate. We are making imports cheaper, and this could 'steamroller' our commodity producers."

S. Assekritov, vice president of the international "Reform" foundation:

"It is pretty easy for the government to keep the dollar in its currency band. Not just because it is in fact a relatively loose straitjacket. And not only because of the currency reserves the Central Bank is pouring onto the market. But also because we are not paying anyone anything here.

"But sooner or later the band will be abolished. And then there will be a catastrophe. Because the dollar will immediately assume its natural position.

"At the moment, given the artificially low dollar rate, importers are merely raising prices — in expectation of changes for the better.

"But no one can really expect any improvement in the immediate future. Although it may be that the political game, which is what forcing the dollar rate to remain low is, will end in defeat."

D. Lvov, academician, deputy director of the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute:

"There used to be a mechanism whereby the dollar rate regulated prices. Now there is no direct link between them — the dollar rate has become a purely mythical thing, of no substance. Prices are determined by internal production costs. The higher the electricity tariffs, credit rates, and so on, the higher the prices.

"The currency band leads eventually to wholesale collapse — closure of banks and the further curtailment of production. Against this background government members' talk of stabilization sound like feasting during the plague."

Government Steps To Improve Taxation System Outlined

MM0711155795 Moscow FINANSOVYYE IZVESTIYA
in Russian 3 Nov 95 p 1

[Article by Yevgeniya Pismennaya: "Authorities Intend to Eliminate Fiscal Distortion in Tax System" — received via Internet]

[FBIS Translated Text] Next year the government intends to tackle in earnest the reform of the country's tax system. According to Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov, the present tax system is not designed to cope with a high inflation level. Some sectors (the fuel and energy complex and banking) also enjoy an unjustifiably lenient taxation regime established by law. There is no means of combating tax evasion in certain spheres of activity (retail trade and the "shuttle" cross-border trade). The tax burden is not distributed fairly among taxpayers.

Representatives of the Finance Ministry and the State Tax Service claim that the approaching tax reform will not bring revolutionary changes and that the system as a whole will be preserved. What is more likely to happen is that it will be purged of the many inefficient tax breaks. Measures will be undertaken to increase the tax collection rate.

The president's budget message proclaims the reduction of the tax burden as one of the main tasks of the tax reform. However, even though the new draft law "On the Fundamentals of the Tax System in the Russian

Federation" abolishes the special tax, the tax on the above-norm labor remuneration fund, and certain local taxes the tax payer will not experience a great easing of the tax burden.

Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov confirmed at the "Russian Tax System" conference that "it is not realistic to expect a further reduction in tax rates in 1996."

The budget losses from the abolition of the special tax will be partially offset by increasing value-added tax [VAT] to 21 percent.

The abolition of the "non-market" tax on the above-norm labor remuneration fund next year will lead to a huge reduction in revenue to the federal budget and the budgets of the components of the federation and a sharp differentiation in pay for workers according to sectors of the national economy and types of activity.

The government is also afraid that the abolition of this tax could mean that for some taxpayers the very concept of profit will cease to exist. In addition to the losses that the budget will suffer as a result of the abolition of the above-norm labor remuneration tax, budget receipts from the profits tax will also fall.

For these reasons the government is examining the question of introducing a special "non-tax" means of regulating pay rises from the beginning of next year.

This mechanism presupposes taxing only that part of the increase in the labor remuneration fund in excess of an increase which is economically justifiable due to the rise in inflation. It is proposed that this should apply only to enterprises with a fairly high level of wages, for example, twice the average level of wages across the country. When wages increase above the level allowed by the inflation rate punitive sanctions of between 100 percent and 300 percent will be levied depending on the amount of the excess payment.

Vladimir Panskov claims that this measure does not have fiscal aims. The Finance Ministry's calculations have shown that if enterprises which are currently exceeding average pay to such an extent continue to do so in 1996 the budget will receive around 2 to 2.5 trillion rubles [R]. The budget should receive R24-R26 trillion in 1995 from the tax on payments in excess of the labor remuneration fund. This tax revenue is not built into next year's budget projections.

This method of regulating pay has been proposed by the Finance Ministry, the Economics Ministry, and the Labor Ministry. The State Tax Service does not like this scheme — it is too complicated to put into practice. The State Duma Budget Committee is categorically opposed to its introduction.

However, Aleksandr Ivaneyev, chief of the tax reforms department, is sure that the country will not remain without an economic mechanism for restricting wage costs in 1996. The State Duma is refusing to adopt this draft law. But if the legislators do not adopt the law "On the Profit Tax" as well as the amendment extending to next year the present system of taxation on above-normal pay costs while increasing the tax-free allowance to 80 times [the minimum wage], the government will introduce a regulatory mechanism for the interim until the present Duma's mandate expires and the newly elected deputies take up their seats. Aleksandr Ivaneyev said that the government is entitled to adopt such decisions because this is a non-tax mechanism.

Admittedly, the government is not entirely sure of the status of the future measure. For example, in his work "The Basic Guidelines of Russia's Financial Policy in 1996," Vladimir Panskov calls this method a "special regulatory tax."

The reduction of local taxes can be explained by the extremely creative approach by components of the federation and local organs of power to the right allowed them to levy taxes independently. Both the Tax Code and the "Fundamentals of the Taxation System in the Russian Federation" set out the government's right to limit the powers of the local and regional authorities. The Tax Code envisages a tough list of local and regional taxes and the law sets a ceiling on them.

The government is planning to introduce amendments to the law "On Personal Income Tax" to prevent high earners from unfairly reducing their share of the tax burden.

One such measure is the introduction of taxation on interest payments on citizens' accounts in banks and on insurance pay-outs. At the same time, to protect the interests of small and medium investors it is proposed to maintain the tax-exempt status of interest and insurance payments within the limits calculated on the basis of the Central Bank's current refinancing rate.

The government also plans to streamline the procedure for the taxation of funds received by citizens from enterprises, institutions, and organizations on a repayable basis. For taxation purposes time limits are set on these payments. This measure could indirectly help to strengthen the payment discipline of leaders of enterprises and organizations. It will also reduce the amount of citizens' total tax-exempt income and the revenue from the sale of property owned with right of title.

With regard to profit tax the following tax concessions are considered inefficient and should be abolished:

- on the creation of reserve and other similar funds which are currently being created by the reduction of taxable profit by joint ventures involving foreign investments and by joint-stock companies;
- on the use of profits to finance non-production capital investments. At the same time the tax concession on the financing of shared capital investments for production purposes is being reinstated;
- on the use of 30 percent of the profit from capital investments for environmental protection measures because that profit is an integral part of the concession on the funding of capital investments for production purposes.

There are another six minor concessions on profit tax among the list of inefficient tax concessions. To prevent profit tax evasion it is proposed that for taxation purposes participants in joint activity where no corporate entity has been formed should distribute the profits of such activity quarterly rather than as stipulated by contracts.

To attract investors to the development of enterprises' production base the list of resources obtained free of charge by enterprises from other enterprises and not included as taxable profit will be extended. Resources obtained by subsidiary enterprises from the parent company will not be subject to taxation on condition that the parent enterprise's share of the subsidiary enterprise's incorporation capital is over 50 percent. Resources transferred between structural subdivisions and branches existing within a single corporate entity are not taxed either. For the same purpose the draft law on amendments to VAT legislation proposes not to impose this tax on funds obtained within the framework of free technical assistance provided by foreign states in accordance with intergovernmental agreements as well as on funds provided free of charge by foreign non-commercial organizations to Russian non-commercial organizations as grants for the implementation of targeted programs.

Some increase in the tax burden can be expected if the amendment is adopted which prescribes that the amount of tax paid on fixed and non-material assets acquired by means of budget appropriations should be regarded as a non-recoverable increase in their book value.

Next year the financial organs are pinning great hopes on the adoption of the law "On the Streamlined System of Taxation and Accounting for the Components of Small-Scale Entrepreneurial Activity." The enactment of this law will make it possible to improve the monitoring of the collection of taxes and switch the emphasis in the tax services' work primarily to large enterprises by reducing the amount of time spent on work with

small enterprises. The criterion whereby enterprises are adjudged to be small — the number of employees — will be changed. For small enterprises in all sectors of the production sphere the figure will be raised to 50 people, for small enterprises in all sectors of the non-production sphere it will remain at 15.

At the same time the government intends to scrap the existing concessions for small enterprises engaged in production activity. They envisaged exemption from tax in the first two years and taxation at a reduced rate for the third and fourth years of their activity. At the same time the legislative organs of the components of the Russian Federation are empowered to set specific

tax breaks for small enterprises within the limits of the profit tax payments paid into the budgets.

The government's draft budget for next year provides for the establishment of a standard procedure for all tax payers for recording the proceeds of sales at the point of dispatch.

The Finance Ministry believes that the measures to improve the tax system next year are aimed at easing its fiscal distortion and creating a "most-favored status" for law-abiding taxpayers when they come to pay their taxes.

International Affairs

New Free Trade Agreement With Russia, Belarus Urged

WS0611153195 Kiev INTELNEWS in English
2104 GMT 5 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ukrainian officials are calling for a new free trade agreement between bordering oblasts of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, which is supposed to boost mutual trade.

Viktor Hladush, Ukraine's deputy foreign trade minister, said the previous agreement, signed in 1993, is defective because about 200 types of commodities, including fuels, non-ferrous metals, timber and cellulose, have been withdrawn from it and subjected to non-tariff regulations.

Hladush said Ukrainian enterprises are suffering US\$ 1.2 billion in losses due to high Russian customs duties on these commodities.

Russia is reportedly ready to put off the restrictions starting next year, according to Hladush. After restrictions are lifted, the trade turnover is expected to greatly increase between the bordering oblasts, especially in agriculture.

General Comments on Fulfilling CFE Commitments

WS0711133795 Kiev KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI
in Russian 31 Oct 95 p 3

[Report by Valeriy Korol from the press service of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry: "The Last Tank Came 'Under the Knife'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In accordance with the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty), the last tank will be destroyed at the Kiev tank repair plant today. Major General Mykola Honcharenko, chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Verification Center, has told us about certain aspects of the three-year long work on dismantling conventional weapons.

[Honcharenko] The CFE Treaty has no time limit and is in force from the Atlantic to the Urals. Twenty-eight European countries, the United States, and Canada are the treaty members. The 1990 Budapest Agreement envisioned a division of weapons among countries of the former Warsaw Pact. However, the Warsaw Pact itself, and then the USSR fell into oblivion. A corresponding agreement was signed in Tashkent in 1992. Ukraine received the right to keep 4,080 combat tanks, 5,050 armored vehicles, 4,040 artillery pieces with a caliber exceeding 100 millimeters, and 330 combat helicopters.

The established levels of weapons should be reached by 17 November 1995 by reducing 1,974 tanks, 1,545 armored personnel carriers, and 550 combat airplanes. The number of artillery pieces and combat helicopters does not exceed the established level.

There is an efficiently developed system of military repair plants in Ukraine, the capacities of which make it possible to carry out the dismantling. As for money, the picture is not as bright. Suffice it to say that some \$5,000 is needed to dismantle one combat tank. As a result, the sum proves to be quite substantial. Still, the state has found a way to fulfill its commitments concerning the reduction of weapons.

The treaty authorizes the dismantling of some weapons by readjusting them to nonmilitary purposes. Using this right, 158 combat tanks and 138 armored vehicles have been transformed into tractors and cranes to be used in the national economy.

National Affairs

Moroz Urges Increased Activity by 'Left-Wing' Forces

LD0711150695 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1240 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev [no dateline as received] — Oleksandr Moroz, the chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council, addressed a "left-wing rally" saying in particular: "We are realists — the 1917 revolution took place and we cannot keep silent about this nor will anyone succeed in concealing this event. To a large extent the independent Ukrainian state grew out of the great socialist October revolution." Touching on current problems, Moroz noted: "The reform process has been so broad that changes for the better will not happen so quickly." In connection with the repeat elections to parliament on 10 December the chairman of the Supreme Council called on the "left-wing" forces to step up their organizational work in order to disseminate "left-wing" ideas. "Everything including how we adopt the Constitution will depend on propaganda work," Moroz noted.

The chairman of the All-Ukrainian Union of Workers addressed the rally. He said: "We will not allow Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma to bind Ukraine to the commercial requirements of the International Monetary Fund. Oleksandr Bozhko, the first secretary of the Kiev city Socialist Party, called for a referendum to be held on 10 December on confidence in Leonid Kosakivskyy, the chairman of the Kiev city state administration, and the entire administration."

The rally approved a resolution that in particular calls on the working people to unite in the struggle for a

Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The resolution ends with the slogan: "Long Live Socialism."

The rally opened with the words of the "International" and ended with the Polish patriotic song, the "Varshavyanka."

After the rally the "left-wing" leaders, in particular, Moroz, Oleksandr Tkachenko, Petro Symonenko, and others laid flowers at the Lenin monument.

Incidentally, Vyacheslav Chornovil, the chairman of the People's Movement of Ukraine, was not allowed to speak even after Moroz had "reserved" him a place.

70,000 People Attend Left-Wing, National-Democratic Rallies

LD0711201295 Kiev UT-1 Television Network in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The day of the 7th November was commented on for our program by Ivan Kuros, deputy prime minister for issues of humanitarian policies, and Yuriy Kravchenko, minister of internal affairs. The subject discussed was the celebrations of the 7th anniversary of the October Revolution that took place in 95 cities and towns of Ukraine. The events organized by the left forces were attended by almost 40,000 citizens and those organized by national-democratic forces — by up to 26,000. According to informed sources, the largest number of participants from the left forces under red banners was registered in Kiev: Almost 5,000; Kharkov had almost 5,000; Donetsk, Lugansk, and Chernigov had 500 people each; Simferopol — just over 100.

On the whole, today has demonstrated that those who predicted mass participation of workers were mistaken: Citizens are no longer inspired by the banners of ruining the Ukrainian state. Observers make a positive conclusion that people think in terms of a constructive building of the state and how to solve their vital problems.

Crimean Communists Call For Restoring Soviet Union

LD0711174695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1631 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SIMFEROPOL, Nov 7 (Interfax - Ukraine) — The Communist Party of Crimea celebrated the 78th anniversary of the October revolution by staging a public rally in the central square of Simferopol.

The rally brought together some 500 men and women. "Long live the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" was its oftenest heard slogan.

The first secretary of the Crimean Communist Party Leonid Grach and the chairman of the Simferopol Workers', Farmers' and Working Intellectuals' Union Valeriy Yefanov deplored the breakup of the Soviet Union and the ban on its Communist Party and called for the restoration of "the lost motherland, the Soviet Union."

The rally demanded that Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma resign as someone who "failed to meet his electoral pledges." They also demanded the reelection of the Ukrainian and Crimean legislatures and the dismissal of both governments, and an end to "the privatization ripoff."

The rally demanded that a nationwide referendum be held on the Ukrainian Constitution.

Regardless of whether the government allows or bans the collection of signatures under a call for a referendum on the restoration of the Soviet Union, the referendum will be held, the rally said.

Economic Issues

Lazarenko, 'Gazprom' Official Reach Gas Accord

AU0811123295 Kiev DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 4 Nov 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "R. Vyakhirev: We Will Supply as Much Natural Gas to Ukraine as It Needs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Pavlo Lazarenko [first vice prime minister] received a delegation of the Russian joint-stock company "Gazprom" [Gas Industry] headed by Rem Vyakhirev, chairman of the board. During a lengthy conversation, the sides discussed problems of natural gas deliveries to Ukraine, the transit of Russian gas across the territory of Ukraine to Western Europe, and the situation with mutual settlements.

An agreement was reached on dividing the payments for the transit of natural gas and payments for its consumption by Ukrainian enterprises.

The state can no longer carry the burden of guarantor for the debts of enterprises for the Russian gas they consume. At the negotiations, Ukraine proposed its own concept of provision with natural gas.

Following the meeting at the Cabinet of Ministers, Rem Vyakhirev, head of the board of the Russian joint-stock company "Gazprom," said in particular this: "A good document has been drafted that determines the mutual relations between the sides in the purchase-sale of Russian natural gas and its transit to Western Europe. Next year, more than 50 billion cubic meters of gas will be supplied to Ukraine. We will supply as much gas to Ukraine as it needs.

"In principle, the ideology of both Russian and Ukrainian sides in the question of payments for natural gas coincides. Nobody's interests will be affected — about this we have reached a firm accord with Ukraine's First Vice Prime Minister P. Lazarenko."

Belarus**Three Thousand Celebrate October Revolution in Minsk***LD0711175095 Minsk Radio Minsk Network
in Belarusian 1700 GMT 7 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belarus has once again officially celebrated the 78th anniversary of the October Revolution, after having abolished it in 1991. True, there were no majestic celebrations or military parade in honor of the public holiday. With the permission of the city Executive Committee, festive functions were held in the capital of the republic by the Movement of Working People of Belarus for Democracy, Social Progress and Justice, the Party of Communists of Belarus, and the Belarusian Union of Officers. This morning there was a rally on Independence Square in Minsk, after which the participants marched in columns to the obelisk on Victory Square. Yawgen Nyaleshka reports:

[Begin Nyaleshka recording] About 3,000 people with banners reading: All power to the soviets, Our strength is in the unity of the workers, [words indistinct] came to Independence Square today. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Clashes Reported at Demonstrations*LD0711174595 Moscow NTV in Russian
1600 GMT 7 Nov 95*

[Report over video by correspondent Aleksandr Stupnikov; from the "Segodnya" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the latest reports from Minsk, OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detach-

me] officers have arrested a group of young people near the parliament building from the Chyrvony Zhond [patriotic youth movement] movement, which was refused permission to hold a demonstration. Other clashes have taken place on the streets, but there have been no serious incidents.

[Stupnikov] [video shows marchers, red flags, pictures of Stalin, lines of militia] Supporters of the communists held a large demonstration in Minsk today. Over one-third of the electorate in the republic support the communists, and even without any military parades, the communist faction will probably be the strongest in parliament.

Today, the demonstrators manhandled someone carrying a white-red-white [democrats' colors] flag, and then went to lay flowers at the eternal flame, but were stopped by the militia. Tempers flared, and a clash was only narrowly avoided.

However, today confirms that eyes left in Belarus is increasingly becoming the ceremonial drill.

The Belarus Supreme Soviet declared today an official holiday. Belarus national radio has been forbidden to use the forms of address spadar, spadarstva — ladies and gentlemen. For the moment, though, you can still choose between comrade and citizen.

Aleksandr Stupnikov, Konstantin Morozov, Belarus, NTV.

Kazakhstan

Almaty-Tehran Flights' Benefits Noted

964F0317A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 2 Nov 95 p 1

[Nikolay Zhorov report: "Beneath the Aircraft's Wing—Tehran"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Almaty-Tehran-Almaty—Following somewhat of a lull, our pilots have once again intensified their operations in the conquest of new international routes. On this occasion an aircraft bearing the symbols of the national airline has set course for the heart of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its capital—Tehran.

As we know, an intergovernmental agreement on the inauguration of air traffic was signed almost two years ago. But the flights of Kazakhstani aircraft had hitherto flown to border Mashhad. Through the efforts of specialists of the Kazakhstan Auye Zholy National Aviation Association of Kazakhstan, the Embassy of Kazakhstan in Tehran, and our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the flight was transferred from Mashhad to the capital of Iran. This step affords new possibilities for both Kazakhstani and Iranian businessmen. The first flight from Almaty carried the Iranian soccer team to Tehran, which had played a match in Ust-Kamenogorsk for the right to move into the next round of the Asian Cupwinners Cup. The Iranians returned happy and will continue to play on the green field.

Unlike them, the airline delegation looked worried: The opening of a new route is always attended by the need for the solution of a whole set of organizational and technical questions. But there was no denying the pilots' optimism. Relations between Iran and Kazakhstan are developing in all directions, from culture and sport through major projects in the sphere of freight haulage.

Thus, for example, the Abay Festival will be held in Tehran as of 10 November. Considering that Iran takes a guarded view of the honoring of foreign figures, this step may be seen as being friendly toward Kazakhstan. Our countries have many points of contact, and it is important to underpin them with real deeds for the development of closer relations. The inauguration of a new route could and should perform a decisive role here.

Iran is a rapidly developing country with a population of 162 million [as published]—there have been big economic transformations in recent years geared to support for and the development of domestic producers. The question of the country's provision with consumer goods and food has practically been solved, and automotive industry is developing rapidly. There are more than 2 million automobiles, of which models made in

Iran enjoy an absolute preponderance, in Tehran alone, for example. The price of gasoline is extremely low, approximately 1 tenge per liter, if calculated into our money.

Of the country's particular features, mention may be made of the strict "dry law" and the commitment to Islam. The citizens are very law-abiding, and if activity does not conform to current laws, no one escapes punishment. Whence there is, consequently, order on the city streets, crime is low, and the citizens need have no fear for their safety. These are decisive factors, most likely in the choice of route for driving purchased automobiles from the Arab Emirates to Kazakhstan.

A distinguishing feature of Tehran are its homes. The majority of them are three- or four-story homes for three to four families, with garages and yards. One's own micro-world making it possible to enjoy a more relaxed lifestyle is created, that is. According to eyewitnesses, very tumultuous, rapid, and high-quality construction is under way in Tehran. Cheap Afghan manpower, which comes to Iran to earn some money, is employed at the construction sites, as a rule.

The Mehrabad International Airport is assigned an important place in the capital also. This is an integral complex of modern terminals with convenient access and a full complement of the requisite services. The airport operates on an intensive schedule with an airliner taking off or landing every minute.

The flight from Almaty to Tehran takes approximately four hours, but this goes by practically unnoticed, especially if the on-board service is well organized, and, God be praised, our pilots on international routes have already learned this.

Donskoy GOK Head on Chrome Industry Change

964F0316A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 2 Nov 95 p 1

[Interview with Raul Shadiyev, general director of the Donskoy GOK Joint-Stock Company and representative of the Japan Chromium Corporation, by Aybas Syzdykov in Aktyubinsk Oblast; date not given: "Donskoy GOK under Foreign Management: What Has Changed, What the Prospects Are"]

[FBIS Translated Text] By a decision of the government of the republic the chromium industry of Kazakhstan has been transferred to the temporary management of the Japanese corporation Japan Chromium Corporation. Including the Donskoy Ore-Dressing Combine. What has changed with the arrival of the new management at the enterprise, which is one of the main suppliers of chromium ore on the world market, and what is its

financial condition? These and other questions asked by our correspondent are answered by Raul Shadiyev, general director of the joint-stock company Donskoy GOK [ore-dressing combine] and a representative of the corporation.

[Syzydykov] Raul Kayumovich, it is known what a very difficult situation the combine ended up in under the previous management—a little more and it would have gone bankrupt. Tell us about this in more detail, and about what you had to start with.

[Shadiyev] You simply could not imagine the condition the combine was in. Just the fines and penalty sanctions on overdue payments to the budget amounted to 1 million tenge per day. Plus, in addition to all this, huge debts were owed for gas and electric power, to the builders, and to various other positions. The sum total of indebtedness amounted to almost 2 billion tenge.

Up to the moment of the transfer the situation in the combine was also difficult, because nothing was being done at the Central mine, which required large capital investments, but such construction projects as the hotel, cultural-health center, and brick factory were undertaken—that is, auxiliary facilities. Therefore, it was necessary to start with unpopular measures—construction was stopped not only on these buildings but also on housing. We proceeded from the fact that if we do not invest money in the mine, within a few years it would turn out that the construction that had been started would be totally unnecessary, because people would leave once the combine was gone.

After our four months here it can be said that the crisis has been overcome. The combine has settled all its debts, covered the requirement for the necessary spare parts, and purchased conveyor belts and cable, acquired eight bulldozers from the Caterpillar Company at a total cost of \$7.5 million, and also large-capacity BelAZ [Belarus Automobile Plant] vehicles, spare parts for them and tires, and several vehicles for serving subunits of the combine.

The wages of workers at the enterprise have been increased by 30 percent. Housing construction has been renewed since September. To begin with, five cottages are being erected. After they are built on a turnkey basis, we will start the next five homes. In addition, we will purchase 28 apartments for our workers. At the same time we are offering the new tenant two variants: He can either not pay for a new apartment, and then it will be departmental, or he can make a monthly payment of one-quarter of his wage and within a year and a half to two years he fully buys the apartment. The measures undertaken made it possible to significantly reduce the

exodus of people from the city and to connect them to the combine.

We are now resolving a complex of social questions regarding the city of Khromtau—we are making arrangements for hot and cold water supplies and central heating, and we are setting up preschool institutions and a lot else, which as before remains on the enterprise's balance sheet. Moreover, a school rest camp operated in the summer. Children traveled to the Czech Republic and Norway at the expense of the enterprise.

There also emerged, so to say, an unforeseen article of expense. Circumstances made it necessary to urgently reinforce paramilitary security, since there have been many thefts of fuel and lubricants, spare parts, and replenishment articles. Some 450 meters of copper cable was stolen once at night from the ore-dressing factory. The assault was accomplished by six unknown persons wearing masks. They locked the employees who were working there at that time in a service building, and then carried out the "action." Such cases of robbery are not isolated. Fanciers of easy money put out of commission expensive equipment which contains copper parts and electrical equipment. That is why it was necessary to undertake defensive measures. A mobile alert group was created, mobile communications means purchased, and transport allotted to the VOKhR [paramilitary security]. In addition, the militia has begun to patrol an industrial area that is enormous in size.

[Syzydykov] Would you recount the results of the audit checks of the financial activity of the former leadership of the combine?

[Shadiyev] Certainly, and I will restrict myself to one example. Previously, this is the system that was employed: The combine supplied the ore, Kazakhintorg [Kazakhstan Foreign Trade] sold it and placed the money received into its own account. Then part of the hard currency was sold to the state, and the remaining sum was returned, not to the combine in Khromtau, but to KRAMDS-Khromit [not further identified] in Aktyubinsk, which used it at its discretion. In April-May of this year KRAMDS-Khromit put 500 million tenge into a deposit account at 120-130 percent annual interest, and then received this interest in the form of profit. At the same time the DGOK [Donskoy GOK], which, naturally, did not have money, was compelled to take out credit at Alembank in order to pay the wages of its workers.

[Syzydykov] As far as I know, with the arrival of the management company, the chromium product sales market has become different. With what aim was this done?

[Shadiyev] Most of all in order to meet the needs of Kazakhstani enterprises for chromium ore. We telegraphed Kazakhintorg that we will ship ore for all the money that arrives before 15 June; however, after this date, we apologize, but there will be no more mutual settlements, inasmuch as the Donskoy GOK has received a license for the sale of its own products and henceforth it does not need a middleman. As for deliveries to Russia, we were compelled to look into whom to sell to and how much. The fact is that the Russian chromium industry used some part of the ore for itself and sold the rest to foreign countries. That is, re-export occurred, in connection with which it turned out that our very own ore constituted competition for us. Naturally we were forced to undertake defensive measures. On the whole the corporation is oriented to selling the final products through Kazakhstani ferro-alloy plants. In the quantitative plan the output of ore to them has increased, and rather substantially. For example, while previously the Yermakov plant received 45-50,000 tonnes, now 70,000 tonnes is shipped to it monthly, since production capacity has been increased there. The same with the Aktyubinsk plant. We have raised the price for ore a little, but not to the price for which we sell it abroad, but much lower.

[Syzykov] How much chromium ore all told do you plan to sell in the next year and a half to two years, taking into account the fact that reserves, which are extracted through the strip mining method, are coming to an end?

[Shadiyev] We still have four small deposits in reserve that we will develop. We are also continuing work on the transition to underground mining. Since June of this year we have already invested from \$1.5 to \$2 million in the Central mine. However, I will not say when, how much, and in what way we will mine ore, because this could provoke an increase or decrease in the price of chromium products as a whole on the world market. This information is confidential.

Kyrgyzstan

Aga Khan's Representative Cited on New Route to Sea

LD0711135695 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network in Kyrgyz 1200 GMT 6 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] President Askar Akayev of the Kyrgyz Republic received [Dal Shmita], personal representative of His Excellency Prince Aga Khan and head of the secretariat for foreign relations of the Aga Khan's development network, in Government House today. Here is an interview by our correspondent, Gulnara Mambetaliyeva:

[Begin [Shmita] recording in English followed by Russian translation] I have discussed with the president a number of proposals in the social sector, particularly with emphasis on southern Kyrgyz region, and these are in the fields of education, mainly, and agriculture.

There were three specific proposals in the education sector, which I would be happy to explain to you, if you would like me to. First and foremost, we would like to initiate a feasibility study for the establishment of a private school in the Osh region, which will have a curriculum which would focus on the teaching of English and economics.

Across the border in Gornyy Badakhshan [Tajikistan], with these types of wheat and already the production has doubled in some cases and in some cases it is possible to do two harvests in a year other than one. [sentence as heard] And we hope that the same kind of result can be achieved in the Osh region, which is geographically similar to the Gornyy Badakhshan region.

And maybe one other point I could mention is that we are very interested in trying to assist and that is the development of a new route to the sea for the Kyrgyz as well as the Tajik republic. The purpose of this route is to provide access to the sea in Pakistan through the Karakoram Highway. And, of course, there are two options. One option is to go through China, and the other one is to go through the Wakhan corridor in [eastern] Afghanistan. We believe that it is in the long-term interests of the Kyrgyz and Tajikistan [republics] for them to have both options, and we are working on the option which leads to a link with Karakoram through the Wakhan corridor. And we are trying to put together a consortium of funders who can do the feasibility [study] of the economic and technical viability of the project. [end recording]

Akayev Addresses Nation, Thanks Supporters

LD0711141395 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network in Russian 1200 GMT 6 Nov 95

[Address to the nation by President Askar Akayev — read by announcer]

[FBIS Translated Text] To all the organizations, work forces, and citizens of the republic who nominated Askar Akayev for the post of president of the Kyrgyz Republic:

Let me express my deep gratitude and indebtedness to you for proposing my candidature for the post of president of the Kyrgyz Republic. I have closely acquainted myself with every report and every cable received and addressed to me over this first week of the election campaign. They strengthen my confidence

that, despite the difficulties of the transition period, the people of Kyrgyzstan have fully resolved to complete the reforms that have been started in the economy, the social sphere, and public life.

I am convinced — and this is of great importance to me — that people of different age, social, and ethnic groups from the various regions of the republic believe that if we preserve unity and accord among the people, if we carry out the large-scale projects that have been worked out recently, if we curb crime while citizens and work forces do their utmost in the regions to strengthen discipline and improve the economy, then the Kyrgyz Republic will enter the 21st century as a country where everybody will be able to provide themselves with the life they deserve, prosperity for their parents, and education for their children.

I dare to assure you, dear friends, that I will deserve your confidence and support. If I am elected president for a second term, I will do my utmost, and use all my accumulated experience in the name of achieving the supreme goal of improving the life of the people, and to place Kyrgyzstan on the course of progress and prosperity.

With respect and gratitude.

[Signed] Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev.
City of Bishkek. 6 November, 1995

First Congress of People's Party Held

*LD0711161395 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1414 GMT 7 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BISHKEK, Nov 7 (Interfax) — The first congress of the People's Party of Kyrgyzstan was held in Bishkek Tuesday. With a membership of 22,500 it is the second biggest party in the country after the Communist party. The 500 delegate strong congress was attended by President Askar Akayev.

The founder and leader of the People's Party Melis Eshimkanov, 34, said their main objective is to defend the interests of the majority, not struggle for power. He said the People's Party would defend the rights and freedom of every person, fight for economic and democratic reforms, for overcoming poverty.

President Akayev told the congress the party has strong influence on the public opinion. Men and women who really want to help the people belong to it, he said.

Akayev submitted to the social support fund of the party keys to ten tractors for farmer members of the party.

Armenia

Russian Atomic Energy Minister Arrives, Says Plant Safe

NC0711182795 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1500 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A delegation of Russian energy specialists headed by Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhaylov arrived in Yerevan today in connection with the start-up of industrial utilization of the Armenian nuclear power plant.

The delegation was received by Armenian Prime Minister Hrand Bagratian the same day. He thanked the minister for the participation of Russian specialists in demothalling the nuclear plant.

The Armenian nuclear plant is reliable and safe, said Viktor Mikhaylov, adding: You should have no doubts about that. You can sleep peacefully.

The Russian minister of atomic energy praised the Armenian and Russian specialists who demothalled the Armenian nuclear plant.

France To Assist With 'Utilization' of Nuclear Waste

NC0711210895 Yerevan ARAGIL ELECTRONIC NEWS BULLETIN in English 1029 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan ("LRAGIR" daily — PAST), 11/07/95 — According to French Envoy on Europe Mr. Michelle Bernie, currently a special project is being prepared, according to which France is going to provide aid in secure operation of the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant.

Particularly, this concerns utilization of the nuclear wastes. It is expected that the project will be implemented with the help of French Framatom organization.

ROA [Republic of Armenia] Ambassador to France Vigen Chitechian said in turn he will hold a number of meetings in France soon, particularly in the Ministry of Finance, in order to resolve the problems of financing for this project. He said that the problem of wastes will be resolved by Framatom, with the use of its "know-how".

Talks on Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Open in Moscow

NC0711200895 Yerevan Radio Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Another round of talks on the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict opened in Moscow on 6 November under the cochairmen of the OSCE Minsk Conference. The agenda includes military-

technical problems envisaged in the agreement ending the military conflict, the coordination of which is expected to help consolidate the cease-fire, implement the peacekeeping process, and further the Minsk process.

According to the Foreign Ministry Press Service, the talks will last until 10 November, after which a meeting of the Minsk Group will be convened at which the conflicting sides will participate in one of the sessions. The Minsk Group will discuss the possibility of activating the negotiating process as well as issues relating to the preparations for the OSCE presidents council meeting on 7 to 8 December.

The Armenian delegation to the talks is headed by Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian.

An official delegation from the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR] headed by the Republic's foreign minister, Arkadi Ghukasian, has also left for Moscow.

Before leaving, Ghukasian told AZG's correspondent: Everybody thinks that as the victorious side the NKR should be the first to make concessions. But political experts in Stepanakert believe Karabakh has already made concessions by agreeing that the final status of NKR be determined at the Minsk Conference. According to the same sources that agreement does not preclude the determination of the NKR's temporary status, which will include the fundamental elements of the final picture. The experts are convinced that concessions should now be made by Azerbaijan, which continues to place unfounded demands on the Karabakh side. Azerbaijani diplomats must answer the question: From where should the NKR Armed Forces withdraw? On the one hand Baku demands the withdrawal of Karabakh troops from the territories under their control and on the other it is unwilling to specify the line to which they should withdraw. Experts say the Azerbaijani delegation's evasion of this issue is understandable, for, in broaching this issue, the sides are returning to the problem of borders, which is closely intertwined with the fundamental problem of clarifying the status of the NKR.

Azerbaijan

Aliyev Addresses Constitutional Committee Members

NC0711165495 Baku Azerbaijan Radio Televiziya Television Network in Azeri 1600 GMT 4 Nov 95

[Speech by President Geydar Aliyev at the Constitutional Committee meeting in Baku on 2 November; recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Esteemed Constitutional Committee members and ladies and gentlemen. The

regular meeting of the Constitutional Committee, which is drawing up the republic's constitution, is in session. It is common knowledge that the committee has carried out significant work. It has drawn up the draft constitution, which has been published in the newspapers so that the people can debate it. We decided during the committee's meeting on 14 October that the draft constitution be finalized in light of the people's proposals by 2 November and the final variant be republished. The final text of the constitution will be put to a referendum during the general elections on 12 November.

Today is Thursday, 2 November. We have not been able to complete our work. The reason is that lots of work has to be done. Meanwhile, several developments have taken a lot of our time. So, the committee will focus its attention on what has to be done and decide the work that has to be carried out in the future.

However, before we resume our work, I want to ask you to observe one minute of silence to remember the republic's citizens who were killed in the accident in the Baku subway. [committee observes silence]

May God bless the souls of those who have been killed.

Our republic's people are well-aware of the work we have carried out in connection with the tragic incident in the subway. The necessary measures were immediately taken. [passage omitted]

The causes of the incident are being investigated. Undoubtedly, it was impossible to express an opinion immediately after the incident. It may be that expressing an opinion is impossible at the present time. What caused the accident? Was it due to a technical fault or a mistake? Or, was it the result of an act of sabotage or a terrorist attack? The possibilities are many. So, none of them can be ruled out. Focusing on only one possibility is impossible. That is the approach we maintain and I have instructed the investigation and administrative organs to very carefully and objectively investigate the causes of the incident.

So, I want to reassure you and the republic's people that we deem it very essential to have the causes of the tragic incident investigated. We will take all the necessary measures to have the causes investigated in an objective way.

Many individuals, including journalists, seem to want to investigate the matter themselves. Articles and rumors have been published, particularly in the opposition newspapers, on the incident. I want to advise the newspapers and their columnists to avoid occupying themselves with such matters. There is no need for them to try to achieve their personal objectives by

exploiting the tragic situation that has befallen our people. Those who want to achieve their objectives should act in accordance with the laws and comply with our traditions. The remarks that the government has failed to adopt a serious approach are empty claims. Undoubtedly, our people will not support them.

I was informed today that those who have fled from Azerbaijan and sought shelter in other places, including Moscow, have made several statements and spread rumors on the incident. That they tried to exploit the tragic incident to promote their personal interests at a time when the people should be united has brought to light that they are devoid of moral values.

The procurator general is among you. I hold talks with him every day. He is the head of the committee which investigates the incident. I have given him many instructions. I held lengthy talks with him last night. He has met the foreign experts who arrived in Azerbaijan. I want to reiterate to you that the causes of the accident must be accurately and objectively established. That will enable us to take the necessary measures.

Undoubtedly, measures must be taken to improve subway services, which is very important for transportation. Meanwhile, measures must be taken against the criminals, that is if a criminal act has been committed.

The Moscow Television Channel broadcast an interview with a leading subway official last night. I watched the program. He was asked to explain the situation on the Moscow subway. He explained the serious condition of their passenger cars. He said that 4,000 passenger cars are in service in the subway and that more than half of them are in serious condition.

That is a reality in our life. We did not manufacture the passenger cars of our subway in the past. We do not manufacture passenger cars. Nor did we manufacture the other equipment that is used in the subway. The equipment and machinery were manufactured and brought to Azerbaijan from many parts of the former Soviet Union. We are using them at the present time. Obviously, the opposition reporters and columnists are not aware of all that. In fact, they are not aware of anything.

I focused significant attention on this field when I worked in Azerbaijan. Most of the Baku subway was constructed when I worked in Baku and Moscow in the past. I served in Moscow as the first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. I was responsible for the transportation complex. So, I supervised the construction of subways in 10 cities at the time. I focused particular attention on the construction of the Baku subway and took measures to resolve problems.

I want to stress that I am not an expert in this field. However, I am aware of the situation because I worked in that domain. So, there is no need to complicate the situation and level calumnies.

Meanwhile, I want to reiterate that I have instructed the procurator general and the investigation organs to carry out serious work and inform me of the outcome of their effort.

I now want to draw your attention to the agenda of the session the committee will hold today. I have explained that we should have finalized the draft constitution in the light of the people's proposals today. That has been impossible. The reasons for this state of affairs are quite clear. All of the proposals have not been included on the agenda that will be discussed today.

However, I want to inform you that I have made a proposal and I have asked the committee to debate it. The proposal is related to article 23 of the draft constitution, which concerns Azerbaijan's state language. Why do I believe that the article should be debated? Why has so much attention been focused on that article? Why have I focused so much attention on it? Obviously, it is one of the main articles in the constitution. Many views have been put forward in connection with our state language in our republic's history. Arguments have taken place on it in the 20th century. So, it has to be debated and a final decision has to be adopted. That is why I believe that the committee should debate the matter.

Another reason for the attention I have focused on article 23 is as follows: You are aware that the National Assembly adopted a resolution on Azerbaijan's state language in December 1992. The representatives of our universities, creative unions, scholars, poets, and writers met at the Academy of Sciences on 31 October. I attended the first session of the meeting. A lengthy discussion was held on the matter. I explained my views, which were broadcast by our television channel. I do not want to reiterate them. I believe that you have followed the broadcast. My speech was published today. Those who have not followed the broadcast can read it in the newspapers.

I want to reiterate that as the chairman of the committee and the president of the republic, I want to have the article debated because our state language is important and several views have been put forward in connection with it. In fact, an illegal law was adopted on the matter in the past. The law that was adopted by the National Assembly in December 1992 ignored its meaning. So, it is an illegal document from the legal point of view. A law should have been adopted to amend the constitution at the time. That was not done. So, the constitution was not changed. The constitution that was adopted in 1978

said: Azerbaijan's state language is to be known as the Azerbaijan Language.

A law was adopted in December 1992. Some 26 National Assembly members supported it. It said that Azerbaijan's state language is the Turkic Language. The article on the state language in the 1978 constitution was not amended. Undoubtedly, it could not have been changed by the law that was adopted in 1992. So, the two have been in effect up until now. That has created significant problems from the legal point of view.

Another aspect of the matter is the fact that many of the people who are experienced in the political field have been uneasy because the law that was adopted in 1992 was illegal. Undoubtedly, the matter showed the irresponsible approach the leading officials in Azerbaijan maintained on such an important matter at the time.

So, as the head of the constitutional committee, I have deemed it necessary to have a special session debate the matter. That is why I have proposed that today's session should focus only on the question of Azerbaijan's state language. [passage omitted]

I now want to ask Ramiz Mekhtiyev to brief the session on the meeting that was held at the academy. I addressed the meeting and left in order not to influence the participants. However, the participants of this meeting, including myself, have to be briefed on the debate that took place at the academy.

Mutalibov Supporters Blamed for Aliyev 'Plot'

LD0711152295 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
1507 GMT 7 Nov 95

[By Sergey Bazhenov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, November 7 (Itar-Tass) — Azerbaijan's law enforcement bodies have put the responsibility for organising a plot to assassinate President Heydar Aliyev into the hands of supporters of ex-president Ayaz Mutalibov, press secretary of the Azerbaijani Embassy in Moscow Farkhad Agamaliyev told ITAR-TASS, quoting reports received from Azerbaijan's Interior Ministry on Tuesday [7 November].

According to the Interior Ministry, Agamaliyev said that "the plan was organized and worked out by supporters of former president Ayaz Mutalibov." It involved the use of self-guided missile launcher Strela-3 aimed at the presidential aircraft. Among the organisers of the plot were named one of the leaders of Azerbaijan's opposition party "Trud" Mamedali Aliyev and some former senior officers and generals of the Defence Ministry, including Shahin Musayev and Vahid Musayev.

The direct responsibility for executing the terrorist act was placed on former commander of the special task police force of the Agdam district of Azerbaijan Faik Bakhshaliyev and a resident of one of the suburbs of Baku Guseinbaly Guseynov.

Only the weather in Baku, a strong wind, forced the presidential plane to change its course while returning home from abroad and land at the Baku airport.

This saved the Azerbaijani president and officials accompanying him from the inevitable death, chief of the central police department of Baku, Colonel Maggeram Aliyev told Itar-Tass correspondents Sevindzh Abdulayeva and Viktor Shulman today.

The police chief showed the journalists the 'Strela-3' missile launching system confiscated from the plotters. He was hurt against the present leadership of the country, because after an unsuccessful armed coup in May 1995, the special police task force was disbanded.

The accused stresses that after arriving on the place, where the presidential plane was expected to land, he refused to commit the terrorist act so as not to let flow the blood of his fellow- countrymen, fearing that the plane may fell on one of the suburbs of the town of Mashtagi.

This is the fourth attempt on the life of President Aliyev for the last two years.

OSCE, UN Observers 'Uneasy' Over Election Procedures

NC0711192195 Baku Azerbaijan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1600 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Our editorial board has today received a statement from the OSCE-UN joint observers mission on elections in Azerbaijan. The statement says: The OSCE-UN joint observers mission on elections in Azerbaijan has been following the election process since mid-September. The registration of the candidates and parties is complete. The mission notes that eight out of 12 parties and 392 candidates have registered to take part in the elections. The mission believes that decisions against the registration of candidates and parties are based on disputable criteria. The mission is uneasy because, contrary to international regulations, no independent expert has been allowed to examine, confirm, or object to the decisions of the official experts.

The real cause of unease is linked with the possibility that some candidates and parties may have been unlawfully deprived of participation in the 12 November 1995 elections. The mission therefore notes that voters have been deprived of freely electing their own representatives.

This is the first report. If need be the OSCE-UN joint observers mission on elections in Azerbaijan will issue another report. It will issue a further report following the voting and the official announcement of the election results.

Georgia

Shevardnadze: More Radical Steps Against Abkhazia Possible

LD0711192695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1908 GMT 7 Nov 95

[By Tengiz Pachkoriya]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TBILISI, November 7 (Itar-Tass) — Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze said the Georgian leadership would consider more radical measures against Abkhazia, Georgia's breakaway enclave, if negotiations with it bring no results.

He told reporters today that the extension of the mandate for peacekeepers in the area of Georgian-Abkhazian conflict would be discussed with leaders of Russia, CIS states and the U.N. Security Council.

Electoral Commission Head Cites Election Results Data

LD0711142595 Tbilisi IPRINDA in Russian 1000 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi, 7 Nov (IPRINDA) — According to an agency correspondent, yesterday afternoon Ivane Kighuradze, chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, gave a news conference.

According to official preliminary data, out of 3,184,000 electors, a total of 2,700,509 (63 percent) electors participated in the elections. The turnout in the presidential elections was 1,490,957. The elections were held in 75 polling districts. So far the results of the presidential elections in 69 electoral districts have been summed up.

In proportional elections the results of 33 polling districts are known. A total of 1,115,937 (75 percent) electors voted for Eduard Shevardnadze; 251,000 (17 percent) for Jumber Patiashvili; 19,338 (1.3 percent) for Akaki Bakradze; 7,940 (0.53 percent) voted for Panteleimon Giorgadze; 7,370 (0.5 percent) voted for Kartlos Gharibashvili, and 5,570 (0.4 percent) for Roin Liparteliani.

In party elections the Union of Citizens of Georgia polled 20.2 percent; the All-Georgian Revival Party received 16.26 percent; the National Democratic Party polled 7.16 percent; the United Communist Party and Social Democrats bloc received 5.3 percent; the Union

of Georgian Traditionalist received 4.5 percent; the Socialist Party polled 3.6 percent; and the 21st Century-Konstantine Gamsakhurdia Society bloc received 3.3 percent.

Shevardnadze Rules Out Reprisals on Presidential Candidates

LD0711184495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1837 GMT 7 Nov 95

[By Tengiz Pachkoriya]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TBILISI, November 7 (Itar-Tass) — Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze told reporters today that any reprisals against his challengers in the race for presidency are absolutely ruled out.

He said no one is going to harass presidential candidates, although some of them "have violated ethical norms and resorted to unfair tackles and methods" in their electioneering campaigns.

Shevardnadze Discusses Elections With Observer Groups

LD0711152895 Tbilisi CONTACT INFORMATION
AGENCY in Georgian 1434 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi [no date as received] — Today, 7 November, head of state Eduard Shevardnadze received members of observer groups from various countries of the world.

According to the observers, the elections in Georgia were held in full compliance with democratic norms, without any breaches of the electoral law. The observers praised the election procedure. However, they noted that there had been negligible drawbacks in a number of organizational issues.

OSCE: Elections Conducted 'Democratically'

LD0711173695 Tbilisi IPRINDA in Russian
1530 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi, 7 Nov — An agency correspondent reports that a news conference was held at the press club today. In the words of Dieter Boden, the head of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission in Georgia, an assessment can already be given of the elections and, despite the nonavailability of the final data, a definite picture can be drawn.

Despite a whole range of shortcomings, the elections were conducted democratically. It was quiet in the regions where incidents had been feared most, in particular South Ossetia and Zugdidi (west Georgia).

International observers had a number of remarks to make concerning the electoral system in Georgia. For instance, it is prohibited abroad for police and people in military uniforms to be present at the polling stations and this system needs to be changed in Georgia.

The electoral system is very complicated: there were three ballot papers and long party lists. There were not enough voting booths, and there were inaccuracies on the electoral lists — citizens who no longer live in the area, have left, or are dead, were still on the lists. According to Boden, there was a lack of professionalism in certain respects. The most positive factor in the elections was the organizers' remarkable enthusiasm.

Democratic elections held in Georgia will be reflected in the further democratic development of the state.

Estonia**Foreign Minister on EU Application, Ties With Russia***LD0711212895 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1800 GMT 7 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] We will begin with the new government's first session. Over to Koit Luus.

[Luus] The most important item on the agenda of the government's first session was the discussion of preparations for the Estonian application to join the EU. [passage omitted] According to Foreign Minister Siim Kallas, Estonia must not be hasty for no good reason. Kallas said that the Latvian application for EU membership, which attracted much attention, had been submitted in the outside world's view first and foremost for domestic political reasons. Since the Latvian application was not received very favorably, according to Siim Kallas, we should in his view avoid acting similarly.

According to Kallas, Estonia must submit its application before the EU intergovernmental conference due in March next year.

[Begin Kallas recording] On the whole, our supporters abroad and our local experts consider it very necessary for us to submit our application before the conference — not right before, but slightly earlier. For this reason we planned to complete this process by submitting our application within the current year. [end recording]

[Luus] Speaking of Estonian-Russian relations, there is conviction at the diplomatic level, according to Siim Kallas, that when it comes to the border agreement the next move will be an agreement at the political level. This, in Kallas's view, is in principle not impossible.

Concerning the July agreements [of 1994], Kallas thinks that the stage of exchanging letters of ratification with Russia must be reached.

[Begin Kallas recording] (?Speaking in light of) foreign policy [word indistinct] I can state firmly that, having kept these issues constantly unresolved in this way, we have caused ourselves quite a lot of damage from the foreign policy point of view. We cannot avail ourselves of any services of our allies elsewhere in the world to help us to resolve some other issues. [end recording]

[Luus] Under the present plan, Siim Kallas will speak on this subject at the Foreign Affairs Commission next Thursday. In Kallas's view it would be beneficial for Estonia to exchange letters of ratification before the Russian State Duma elections which are due to take place on 17 December. [passage omitted]

Tallinn Says UN Criticism of Human Rights Unfair*LD0711183895 Tallinn Estonian Television Network in Russian 1645 GMT 7 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Estonian Foreign Ministry views as unfair the assessment made by a UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva on 3 November, on the human rights situation in Estonia. This is what Foreign Minister Siim Kallas told a news conference today. In his view this fact demonstrates that Estonia's propaganda work and debates on this subject at present have turned out to be weaker than certain other forces. Estonia intends to send its permanent representatives to Geneva to carry out similar work in the future with greater success. Kallas added that a minimum of eight various missions and groups of experts have checked the situation in Estonia regarding human rights and concluded that the Estonian legislation meets all the requirements.

As is known, on 3 November, the UN Commission on Human Rights recommended that Estonia review its laws governing the rights of the minorities, and among other things also criticized the far-too-stringent language requirements for the granting of citizenship.

Border Talks With Russia Postponed*WS0811094095 Tallinn BNS in English 1807 GMT 7 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Nov 7, BNS — The next scheduled round of talks under the Estonian-Russian border negotiations has been postponed for technical reasons, the Estonian chief negotiator said on Tuesday.

The talks were originally scheduled for Thursday and Friday (Nov. 9-10), but are now expected to take place next week, said Raul Malk, vice chancellor of the Estonian Foreign Ministry and head of the country's negotiating team.

Malk said the postponement was not due to political reasons. "We simply planned (the interval) too short last time," he told BNS.

The last round of talks took place in the Russian town of Pskov on Oct. 23-24.

The talks in Pskov ended with agreement on a blueprint that is expected to become the basis of the border agreement.

Vahi Receives Congratulatory Message From Chernomyrdin

LD0711171395 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1600 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin was the first foreign country's representative to congratulate Tiit Vahi on his reappointment as the government leader. Vahi today received Aleksandr Trofimov, the Russian ambassador to Estonia, who handed over Chernomyrdin's congratulations. Vahi and Trofimov discussed the present state of Estonian-Russian relations, the July agreements, and border issues, according to the government press service.

Meri Enacts Laws on Criminal Accountability for Leaders

LD0811113795 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1000 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Estonian President Lennart Meri has promulgated the two laws on bringing criminal charges against high-ranking state officials. The laws regulate the bringing of criminal charges against president, prime minister, and members of government and Riigikogu.

All high-ranking state officials can be brought to bear criminal responsibility with the approval of the majority of the parliament and on the proposal from the Chancellor of Justice.

The first person to be threatened by the new law is Heiki Kranich, a Riigikogu member and one of the leaders of the Reform Party. He is suspected of misuse of his position in the former West Estonian Bank. [passage omitted]

Latvia

President Announces Plan To Run for Reelection

LD0811110695 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1000 GMT 8 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] State President Guntis Ulmanis has decided to run for reelection. The president told the DIENA newspaper that the reason for this decision is that looking at what is happening he sees no other way of continuing what has been started and to stay in politics. If he does not run he will go against the work he has done.

The Saeima elects the president for a period of three years and Guntis Ulmanis' term expires next July.

Ulmanis Invites Maris Grinblats To Form New Government

LD0711172795 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1600 GMT 7 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The first plenary session of the sixth Saeima ended 40 minutes ago. The present Cabinet of Ministers resigned. It will, however, continue its work until a new government takes over.

President Guntis Ulmanis made an announcement concerning the new head of government. He asked Maris Grinblats, a representative of the National Bloc, to form a government.

The choice of prime minister did not depend on the results of the election of the Saeima chairman, President Ulmanis told journalists. The prime minister was not (?chosen) during a period of a few hours in the Saeima today, but rather during the last month, weighing all the arguments for and against and comparing draft government declarations of the two blocs. The composition of the possible new government also influenced the choice of prime minister.

President Ulmanis also told journalists today that he will not in future enter into any talks with Joahims Zigerists, the leader of the People's Movement for Latvia. Yesterday, the president received a threatening letter from Zigerists. This was the first threatening letter in his life. I do not think that [words indistinct] making the choice of the candidate for the post of prime minister. I will continue to act on the basis of my convictions, independent of whether such political forces support my continuation in the office of president or not, he said.

President Ulmanis said that he is not intending to retire today or tomorrow. Therefore, the law on provisions for the work of state president passed by the Saeima is not topical and cannot influence the president's actions.

ITAR-TASS Provides Biography of Grinblats

LD0811161295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1238 GMT 8 Nov 95

[By Galina Kuchina]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] RIGA, November 8 (Itar-Tass) — Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis announced the name of his candidate to the post of prime minister at a session of the new parliament on Tuesday. It was Maris Grinblats. He was assigned to form the cabinet, which should be approved by the parliament.

Today's newspapers carry the biography of Grinblats, analyse his political platform and make forecasts about his first steps.

Grinblats, 40, comes from a family, which fell victim to repressions. He served in the Soviet Army between 1974 and 1976. His political career began in 1988: he was one of those who created the Popular Front. Two years later he was elected chairman of the Congress of Citizens, and in 1993 — member of parliament from the Motherland and Freedom association. In October 1994 he was member of the parliamentary group, which supported Dudayev.

The SM-SEGODNYA newspaper wrote that the Motherland and Freedom association was suggesting a referendum on the revision of the law on citizenship with the aim to reduce the number of people, who have the right to Latvian citizenship.

Grinblats contributed recently an article to the DIENA newspaper, in which he described as unacceptable "the idea about giving equal rights to citizens and non-citizens and about letting non-citizens participate in the election of local government bodies" (in Latvia one third of the population, mostly Russian-speaking people, are considered to be non-citizens).

The would-be prime minister does not agree with those who believe that the European Union should

include Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. He opposes "the recurrence of the time, when people from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus could freely move to Latvia in search of employment and settle there."

National Bloc, Latvian Way Seek Support To Form Government

*LD0811144395 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1300 GMT 8 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Representatives of the Saeima [parliament] factions of the National Bloc and the Latvian Way today agreed to start consultations with representatives of other factions on possible support in forming a government. Maris Grinblats, the nominated candidate for the post of prime minister, believes that it is possible for the National Bloc to find supporters among the deputies of the factions of the National Reconciliation Bloc. Most realistically, the government which is being formed by him could be supported by deputies from the Unity Party faction. He came to such a conclusion while assessing the results of yesterday's election to the Saeima presidium.

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